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3.1 Introduction
The importance of institutions in the processes of economic growth and
development is now well recognized.1 Despite the consensus about their
signiﬁcance, our understanding of where institutions come from and how
institutions that do not work well persist over time remains limited. How
institutions matter depends, in part, on whether they are exogenous or en-
dogenous and on the factors and processes that shape or determine them.
Unfortunately, the study of how institutions evolve is not straightforward.
Not only does institutional change take place gradually over long periods
of time, but the likelihood of diﬀerent causal mechanisms being involved
further complicates analysis. Despite these formidable challenges, in re-
cent years researchers have made signiﬁcant contributions to our knowl-
edge of how institutions as fundamental as universal adult suﬀrage, prop-
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1. For a classic statement of this view, see North (1981).erty rights in intellectual capital, and public schools evolved over time and
place.2
Tax systems are among the oldest and most fundamental of institutions.
Taxes are necessary to raise revenue for governments to fund their opera-
tions and to ﬁnance investments in public goods and other sorts of public
services conducive to general welfare and economic growth. How govern-
ments raise revenue can have profound eﬀects on society. First, the techni-
cal eﬃciency of the tax system is important. Taxes alter the decisions of
private agents, as taxpayers strive to reduce their tax liabilities.3 Taxes also
impose enforcement costs on governments and compliance costs on tax-
payers. The structure of taxes, as well as of other forms of government reg-
ulation, may also inﬂuence the organization of economic activities, such as
whether ﬁrms operate in the formal or informal sector or whether ﬁrms en-
ter into formal employment arrangements with workers.
Second, the tax system helps determine how much of the costs of pub-
licly provided goods and services are borne by diﬀerent segments of the
population. The incidence of taxes aﬀects both the distribution of dispos-
able income across the population as well as the constellation of political
support for various public projects. Individuals are more willing to support
government programs if they expect that the beneﬁts they, or their peer
groups, would realize from the higher level of expenditures will roughly
match or exceed the corresponding increase in their tax liabilities.4
Third, although the lines of causation are not always clear, how societies
choose to raise tax revenue is related to the relative degrees of authority of
local, state, and national governments. Control over public expenditures
generally follows the power to tax. As the political and administrative fea-
sibility of levying certain taxes may be sensitive to economy-speciﬁc cir-
cumstances, those circumstances may also inﬂuence the structure of gov-
ernment as well as the extent and direction of government activities. For
example, to the extent that local governments are more dependent on taxes
on property than other levels of government are, societies that lack the
public authority or administrative capacity to eﬀectively implement such
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2. See, e.g., Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002, 2005). Also see Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000), and Khan and Sokoloﬀ (2001).
3. Such adjustments can often lead economies to operate below their productive capacity,
as taxpayers allocate their resources to those activities that yield the highest net returns after
taxes, as opposed to those that would make the most productive use of resources.
4. Recent studies of quite distinct settings have yielded remarkably consistent ﬁndings re-
garding less government provision of public services in ethnically or otherwise heterogeneous
polities. The mechanisms that account for this pattern remain unclear, but may have to do
with more diverse populations being hampered by higher costs of reaching a consensus (re-
solving the collective action problem) or with there being greater economic and political in-
equality across social groups in such contexts. For examples of this literature, see Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly (1999); and Chaudhary (2006). For discussion of the mechanisms by
which the option of the rich to substitute private goods for public goods can inhibit reform or
provision of government services, see Hirschman (1970).taxes might be expected to have relatively small local governments and low
levels of public investments and expenditure programs (e.g., schools or lo-
cal roads) whose beneﬁts accrue primarily to local residents.
Striking contrasts exist today between the tax systems of developed and
developing countries.5 Tax systems in developed countries derive most of
their revenue from individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, and
broad-based consumption taxes. Such tax systems are commonly regarded
as more progressive in incidence than those of developing countries—
whose tax revenues come largely from taxes on consumption, in the form
of value-added or turnover taxes, excise taxes, and taxes on foreign trade.
As a percentage of gross domestic product, aggregate tax revenues in de-
veloping countries are only about half the tax revenues of developed coun-
tries. Developing countries are also more likely to impose and collect taxes
at the national level rather than extend substantial taxing authority to state
and local governments.
Why tax systems vary is a diﬃcult question. Scholars have noted that
both the level of taxation and the relative use of diﬀerent tax instruments
tend to be systematically related across economies to factors such as per
capita income, the share of wages as a percentage of national income, the
share of national income generated by large establishments, the share of
agriculture in total production, and the level of imports and exports.6
Many observers have suggested that these patterns arise primarily from
technical or resource issues in the design of tax structures. Proponents of
this view highlight how, for example, it is less feasible to administer an in-
dividual income tax in countries with a large informal sector than it would
be in countries where most individuals have stable full-time employment
relationships with large ﬁrms.7 They contend that the major reason for the
striking diﬀerences between the tax systems of the developed and less-
developed nations is that rich countries have more choices in deciding the
level of taxation and the tax mix (the relative use of diﬀerent tax instru-
ments).8 Although not inconsistent with this common wisdom, other
scholars have emphasized how political factors can inﬂuence the design
and administration of tax systems.9Groups with great inﬂuence are not in-
frequently able to tilt or shape the structures of taxation, if not of public ﬁ-
nance more generally, in their favor.
We turn to history to gain a better perspective on how and why tax sys-
tems vary. Our focus is on the societies of the Americas over the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. Our interest in the experiences in North and Latin
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5. See Tanzi (1987); and Burgess and Stern (1993).
6. See, e.g., Tait, Gratz, and Eichengreen (1979).
7. See Goode (1984); and Musgrave and Musgrave (1984, 790–96).
8. See Tanzi and Zee (2000).
9. For a pioneering discussion of the inﬂuence of politics on the design of tax systems in
Central America, see Best (1976). More generally, see Reese (1980).America has two principal sources. First, despite the region having the
most extreme inequality in the world, the tax structures of Latin America
are generally recognized as among the most regressive, even by develop-
ing country standards.10 Moreover, Latin American countries typically
(though there are exceptions) have low levels of taxation and collect rela-
tively modest tax revenues at the provincial or local level. Improving our
knowledge of when and how these rather distinctive patterns in taxation
and public ﬁnance emerged may help us to better understand both the
long-term development of the region as well as the processes of institu-
tional formation and change more generally.
Second, as has come to be appreciated by social scientists, the coloniza-
tion and development of the Americas constitute a natural experiment of
sorts that students of economic and social development can exploit. Be-
ginning more than 500 years ago, a small number of European countries
established colonies in diverse environments across the hemisphere. The
diﬀerent circumstances meant that largely exogenous diﬀerences existed
across these societies, not only in national heritage, but also in the extent
of inequality. Relatively high per capita incomes (by the standards of the
time) prevailed throughout the Americas, at least through the late eigh-
teenth century, and many of these colonies had gained their independence
from their European overlords by the early nineteenth century. The record
of what sorts of institutions these new, prosperous, and nominally demo-
cratic nations established, and how they evolved over time, provides schol-
ars with a useful laboratory to study the sources of systematic patterns in
the evolution of tax systems.
When tax scholars explore the relationship between inequality and tax-
ation, they tend to focus on how tax systems may alter the after-tax distri-
bution of income or wealth, either directly through government takings or
transfers, or indirectly through their inﬂuence on the decisions of individ-
uals (or households) about labor supply, savings, or investments.11Here we
take a diﬀerent approach, by examining whether exogenous diﬀerences in
the extent of inequality might have inﬂuenced the design and implementa-
tion of tax systems. We highlight how even when the income levels across
the societies of the Americas were relatively similar, the tax structures in
the United States and Canada looked very diﬀerent from those in Latin
America. Moreover, we raise the question of whether these diﬀerences in
taxes, and in related spending patterns, might have played a role in ac-
counting for quite divergent paths of long-run development. Our thesis
that inequality plays an important independent role in inﬂuencing the
86 Kenneth L. Sokoloﬀ and Eric M. Zolt
10. For estimates of income inequality in Latin America and extensive treatment of these
issues, see De Ferranti et al. (2004). Also see the discussion of the regressivity of tax systems
in Latin America, Bird (2003).
11. For example, see Slemrod and Bakija (2001).structure of taxation is also supported by comparisons across regions of
the United States.
Previous studies have shown how initial and rather extreme diﬀerences
in the extent of inequality seem to have contributed to systematic diﬀer-
ences in the ways that strategic economic institutions evolved across the
Americas. The earlier work explored how a number of mediating mecha-
nisms (paths of institutional development) through which high initial in-
equality may have led to poor economic outcomes through its impact on
the evolution of fundamental policies inﬂuencing access to suﬀrage,
schooling, and land, but did not look at tax policy (or at the level and type
of government expenditures). The purpose of this paper is to examine
whether the extreme diﬀerences in inequality that were present across the
economies of the Americas soon after colonization also aﬀected the ways
tax institutions evolved. We argue that they did, and proceed as follows. Part
two sets forth a brief history of the emergence of extreme diﬀerences in in-
equality across the Americas not long after the Europeans began to colo-
nize the hemisphere. Part three then examines the tax systems in Latin
America and North America in the nineteenth century. Part four discusses
how these tax structures evolved over the twentieth century. In part ﬁve we
oﬀer some tentative conclusions about what the legacy of extreme inequal-
ity in Latin America meant for the long-run pattern of tax design and ex-
penditure policy in that region.
Several salient patterns emerge. The United States and Canada (like
Britain, France, Germany, and even Spain) were much more inclined to tax
wealth and income during their early stages of growth, and into the twen-
tieth century, than were their neighbors to the south.12 Although the
United States and Canadian federal governments were similar to those of
their counterparts in Latin America in relying primarily on the taxation of
foreign trade (overwhelmingly tariﬀs) and excise taxes, the greater success
or inclination of state (provincial) and local governments in North Amer-
ica to tax wealth (primarily in the form of property or estate taxes) and in-
come (primarily in the form of business taxes), as well as the much larger
relative sizes of these subnational governments in North America, ac-
counted for a radical divergence in the overall structure of taxation. Tap-
ping these progressive (at least as conventionally understood) sources of
government revenue, state and local governments in the United States and
Canada, even before independence, began directing substantial resources
toward public schools, improvements in infrastructure involving trans-
portation and health, and other social programs. In contrast, the societies
of Latin America, which had come to be characterized soon after initial
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12. For example, land and other assessed taxes generally accounted for between 15 and
40 percent of revenue to the British government over the period 1690 to 1790. See Brewer
(1990, 98).settlement by rather extreme inequality in wealth, human capital, and po-
litical inﬂuence, tended to adopt tax structures that were signiﬁcantly less
progressive in incidence and manifested greater reluctance or inability to
impose local taxes to fund local public investments and services. These pat-
terns have persisted well into the twentieth century—indeed, up to the
present day.
3.2 Diﬀerences in Inequality across the Americas
Our study builds on recent scholarship that has highlighted how radical
diﬀerences in the extent of inequality across New World societies were pres-
ent early on in the histories of the colonies established by the Europeans.13
These diﬀerences, it is argued, were due primarily to factor endowments
(or initial conditions more generally). Common to nearly all of the colo-
nies was a high marginal product of labor, as evidenced by the historically
unprecedented numbers of migrants who traversed the Atlantic from Eu-
rope and Africa despite high costs of transportation, as well as by the
roughly similar levels of per capita income that prevailed until well into the
eighteenth century (or more than two centuries after the colonies began to
be established).
Scholars seem increasingly to accept that whereas the great majority of
colonies in the Americas came to be characterized early on by substantial
inequality, the colonies that came to make up the United States and
Canada were quite unusual in that their factor endowments predisposed
them toward paths of development with relative equality and population
homogeneity. In explaining the logic and empirical basis for this theory, it
is convenient to distinguish between three types of New World colonies. A
ﬁrst category encompasses those colonies with climates and soils that were
well suited for the production of sugar and other highly valued crops char-
acterized by extensive scale economies associated with the use of slaves.
Most of these sugar colonies, including Barbados, Cuba, and Saint Do-
mingue (known now as Haiti), were in the West Indies, but some (mainly
Brazil) were located in South America. They soon specialized in the pro-
duction of such crops, and their economies came to be dominated by large
slave plantations and their populations by slaves of African descent.
The overwhelming fraction of the populations that came to be black and
slave in such colonies, as well as the greater eﬃciency of the very large plan-
tations, made their distributions of wealth and human capital extremely
unequal.14
The second category of New World colonies comprises the Spanish
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13. See Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002).
14. Even among the free population, such economies exhibited greater inequality than
those on the North American mainland. For a detailed examination of the distribution of
wealth among free household heads on a sugar island, see Dunn (1972).colonies, such as Mexico and Peru, that were characterized both by a sub-
stantial native population that survived contact with the European colo-
nizers and by the distribution among a privileged few of claims to often
enormous blocs of land, mineral resources, and native labor. The resulting
large-scale estates and mines, established early in the histories of these
colonies, were to some degree based on preconquest social organizations
in which Indian elites extracted tribute from the general population, and
the arrangements endured even when the principal production activities
were lacking in economies of scale. Although small-scale production was
typical of grain agriculture during this era, the essentially nontradable
property rights to tribute (in the form of labor and other resources) from
rather sedentary groups of natives gave large landholders the means and
the motive to operate at a large scale. For diﬀerent reasons, therefore, this
category of colonies was rather like the ﬁrst in generating very unequal dis-
tributions of wealth. The elites relied on the labor of Native Americans in-
stead of slaves, but like the slave owners, they were racially distinct from the
bulk of the population and they enjoyed higher levels of human capital and
legal standing.15
To almost the same degree as in the colonial sugar economies, the eco-
nomic structures that evolved in this second group of colonies were greatly
inﬂuenced by the factor endowments, viewed in broad terms. The fabu-
lously valuable mineral resources and the abundance of low human-capital
labor certainly contributed to the extremely unequal distributions of
wealth and income that generally came to prevail in these economies.
Moreover, without the abundant supply of native labor, the generous
awards of property and tribute to the earliest settlers would not have been
worth so much (if even possible), and it is highly unlikely that Spain would
have introduced the tight restrictions on European migration to its
colonies that it did. The early settlers in Spanish America had endorsed,
and won, formidable requirements for obtaining permission to go to the
New World—a policy that surely helped to preserve the political and eco-
nomic advantages they enjoyed and kept the share of the population that
was of European descent low.
The ﬁnal category of New World colonies is typiﬁed by those on the
northern part of the North American mainland, chieﬂy those that became
the northern United States, but also Canada. These economies were not
endowed either with substantial native populations able to provide labor or
with a climate and soils that gave them a comparative advantage in the pro-
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15. It is not clear whether the existence of scale economies, such as slavery, supported the
competitive success or persistence of the largest units of production in this second class of
colonial economies. Rather, large-scale enterprises may have been sustained by the natives’
inability or disinclination to evade their obligations to the estate-owning families. For an ex-
cellent and comprehensive overview of the encomienda and the evolution of large-scale es-
tates, see Lockhart and Schwartz (1983).duction of crops characterized by major economies in using slave labor.
Their growth and development were therefore based on populations of Eu-
ropean descent who had similar levels of human capital. Owing to the
abundant land and low capital requirements, the great majority of adult
men were able to operate as independent proprietors. Eﬀorts to implant a
European-style organization of agriculture based on concentrated owner-
ship of land, with labor provided by tenant farmers or indentured servants,
invariably failed in such environments. Conditions were somewhat diﬀer-
ent in the southern colonies, where crops such as tobacco and rice exhib-
ited limited scale economies. Even so, the size of the slave plantations and
the share of the population composed of slaves were both quite modest by
the standards of Brazil or the sugar islands.16
Overall, there seems to be strong evidence that various features of the fac-
tor endowments of the three categories of New World economies, includ-
ing soils, climates, and the size or density of the native population, predis-
posed them toward paths of development associated with diﬀerent degrees
of inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power. Although
these conditions might reasonably be treated as exogenous at the beginning
of European colonization, it is clear that such an assumption becomes in-
creasingly tenuous as one moves later in time after settlement. Particularly
given that both Latin America and many of the economies of the ﬁrst cat-
egory, such as Haiti, Brazil, and Jamaica, are still among the most unequal
in the world, however,  the initial conditions seem to have had long-
lingering eﬀects. Not only were certain fundamental characteristics of
New World economies diﬃcult to change, but government policies and
other institutions tended generally to reproduce them. Speciﬁcally, in
those societies that began with extreme inequality, the elites may have been
better able to shape the evolution of rules, laws, and other institutions to
advantage themselves—contributing to persistence over time in the extent
of inequality.
The history of the evolution of suﬀrage institutions provides a powerful
demonstration of how there were indeed systematic patterns across societies
in the degree to which elites established a legal framework that ensured
them a disproportionate share of political power.17 Summary information
about diﬀerences in how the right to vote was restricted across New World
societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is reported in
table 3.1. The estimates reveal that while it was common in all countries to
reserve the right to vote to adult males until the twentieth century, the
United States and Canada were the clear leaders in doing away with
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16. See Galenson (1995); and Greene (1988).
17. Our discussion of the evolution of suﬀrage institutions draws from Engerman and
Sokoloﬀ(2005). It is perhaps worth emphasizing that most of the countries featured here were
independent of their colonial masters and were nominal democracies by the middle of the
nineteenth century.Table 3.1 Laws concerning the franchise and voting participation in selected
countries, 1840 to 1940
Period and  Lack of secrecy  Wealth  Literacy  Percent of the 
country Year in balloting requirement requirement population voting
1840–1980
Chile 1869 No Yes Yes 1.6
Costa Rica 1890 Yes Yes Yes
Ecuador 1856 Yes Yes Yes 0.1
Mexico 1840 Yes Yes Yes
Peru 1875 Yes Yes Yes
Uruguay 1880 Yes Yes Yes
Venezuela 1880 Yes Yes Yes
Canada 1878 No Yes No 12.9
United States 1850 No No No 12.9
1881–1920
Argentina 1916 No No No 9.0
Brazil 1914 Yes Yes Yes 2.4
Chile 1920 No No Yes 4.4
Colombia 1918 No No No 6.9
Costa Rica 1919 Yes No No 10.6
Ecuador 1894 No No Yes 3.3
Mexico 1920 No No No 8.6
Peru 1920 Yes Yes Yes
Uruguay 1920 No No No 13.8
Venezuela 1920 Yes Yes Yes
Canada 1917 No No No 20.5
United States 1920 No No Yes 25.1
1921–1940
Argentina 1937 No No No 15.0
Brazil 1930 Yes Yes Yes 5.7
Colombia 1936 No No No 5.9
Chile 1938 No No Yes 9.4
Costa Rica 1940 No No No 17.6
Ecuador 1940 No No Yes 3.3
Mexico 1940 No No No 11.8
Peru 1940 No No Yes
Uruguay 1940 No No No 19.7
Venezuela 1940 No Yes Yes
Canada 1940 No No No 41.1
United States 1940 No No Yes 37.8
Sources: Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002, 2005).
Notes: The information on restrictions refers to national laws. In Colombia, the 1863 Con-
stitution empowered provincial state governments to regulate electoral aﬀairs. Afterward,
elections became restricted (in terms of the franchise for adult males) and indirect in some
states. It was not until 1948 that a national law established universal adult male suﬀrage
throughout the country. This pattern was followed in other Latin American countries, as it
was in the United States and Canada to a lesser extent. Two states, Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts, introduced literacy requirements during the 1850s. Sixteen states—seven southern
and nine northern—introduced literacy requirements between 1889 and 1926.restrictions based on wealth and literacy, and much higher percentages of
the populations voted in these countries than anywhere else in the Ameri-
cas. Although there was important variation in these requirements within
Latin America, it is clear that there was much greater political equality in
the United States and Canada during the nineteenth century than there was
elsewhere in the hemisphere. Indeed, as there were other channels through
which elites could inﬂuence political outcomes, the rules specifying who
could vote likely understates the extent to which elites were able to wield dis-
proportionate power in the formulation and implementation of government
policies. Not only did the United States and Canada attain the secret ballot
and extend the franchise to even the poor and illiterate much earlier (re-
strictions that were reintroduced in the United States at the expense of
blacks in the 1890s), but the evolution of the proportion of the population
that voted was at least a half-century ahead of even the most progressive
countries of South America (namely, Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica,
whose initial factor endowments and extent of inequality were most like
those of the United States and Canada). It is remarkable that as late as 1900,
none of the countries in Latin America had the secret ballot or more than a
miniscule fraction of the population casting votes.
Although many factors may have contributed to the comparatively very
low levels of voting participation in Latin America, the wealth and literacy
(which were increasingly introduced over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury and maintained in much of South America well into the twentieth cen-
tury) requirements were obviously (given the literacy rates reported subse-
quently) serious constraints. The contrast between the United States and
Canada, on the one hand, and the Latin American countries, on the other,
was not so evident at the outset, and not due to diﬀerences in ideology re-
lated to national heritage. Despite the sentiments popularly attributed to
the Founding Fathers, voting in the United States was largely a privilege re-
served for white men with signiﬁcant amounts of property until early in the
nineteenth century. Even as late as 1815, only four states had adopted uni-
versal white male suﬀrage. The ﬁrst-movers in the movement to broaden-
ing access to suﬀrage were the states on the frontier, those entering the
Union after the original thirteen, who virtually all chose in their very ﬁrst
state constitutions to extend voting rights to white men (with explicit racial
restrictions generally introduced in the same constitutions that did away
with economic requirements). Older states were then spurred, through in-
tense political debates and struggles, to revise their laws.
The leadership of the relatively more egalitarian frontier states in ex-
tending the franchise not coincidentally paralleled liberal policies toward
public schools, access to land, and other issues of interest to potential mi-
grants.18 Labor scarcity exerted a direct inﬂuence on the initial level of in-
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18. See the more detailed discussion in Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2005).equality across New World colonies, because of its impact on the returns
to labor, but it also had indirect eﬀects. It is to us signiﬁcant that the lead-
ers in extending suﬀrage (and establishing other institutions providing
broad access to opportunity), such as the new states to the United States,
Argentina, and Uruguay, did so during periods in which they were striving
to attract migrants and when such policies were thought to be attractive to
those contemplating relocation. When elites—such as landowners or other
asset holders—desire common men to locate in the polity, they thus may
freely choose, ﬁnding it in their own private interests, to extend access to
privileges and opportunities; indeed, a polity (or one set of elites) may ﬁnd
itself competing with another to attract the labor or whatever else is de-
sired.
Diﬀerences in the distribution of political power seem to have fed back
on the distribution of access to economic opportunities and in invest-
ment in public goods in ways that had fundamental implications for the
persistence of inequality and long-run paths of institutional and eco-
nomic development more generally. Schooling institutions are an excel-
lent example. Although most New World societies were so prosperous by
the early nineteenth century that they clearly had the material resources
to support the establishment of a widespread network of primary
schools, only a few made such investments on a scale suﬃcient to serve
the general population before the twentieth century. The exceptional so-
cieties, in terms of leadership in investing in institutions of primary edu-
cation, were the United States and Canada. Virtually from the time of
settlement, these North Americans began to develop institutions that
would provide local children with a basic education, including the ability
to read and write. It was common for schools to be organized and funded
at the village or town level, especially in New England. The United States
is generally credited with having the most literate population in the world
by the early nineteenth century, but the common school movement,
which got under way in the 1820s (following closely after the movement to
extend the franchise), put the country on an accelerated path of invest-
ment in educational institutions that served a broad range of the pop-
ulation. Between 1825 and 1850, nearly every northern state that had not
already done so enacted a law strongly encouraging or requiring locali-
ties to establish free schools open to all children and supported by gen-
eral taxes.19 Although the movement made slower progress in the South,
schooling had spread suﬃciently by the mid-nineteenth century that over
40 percent of the school-age population was enrolled, and nearly 90 per-
cent of white adults were literate (see table 3.2). Canada soon followed
the United States in establishing tax-supported schools with universal ac-
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19. See the discussion in Cubberley (1920), as well as in Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloﬀ
(2002).cess, and its literacy rates were nearly as high by the second half of the
nineteenth century.20
The rest of the hemisphere trailed far behind the United States and
Canada in primary schooling and in (the closely related) attainment of lit-
eracy. Despite great wealth, the British colonies elsewhere in the hemi-
sphere (such as Guyana and Jamaica) lagged badly in providing basic
schooling to broad segments of the population.21 Similarly, even the most
progressive Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay,
were more than seventy-ﬁve years behind. Although Argentina had one
of the highest per capita incomes in the world, the literacy rate of native-
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Table 3.2 Literacy rates in selected countries of the Americas, 1860–1920
Country Year Age Rate (%)
Argentina 1869 6 and above 23.8
1900 10 and above 52.0
Bolivia 1900 10 and above 17.0
Brazil 1872 7 and above 15.8
1900 7 and above 25.6
1920 10 and above 30
Chile 1865 7 and above 18
1900 10 and above 43
Colombia 1918 15 and above 32
Costa Rica 1892 7 and above 23.6
1925 10 and above 64
Guatemala 1893 7 and above 11.3
1925 10 and above 1.5
Mexico 1900 10 and above 22.2
Paraguay 1886 10 and above 19.3
1900 10 and above 30
Peru 1925 7 and above 38
Uruguay 1900 10 and above 54
1925 10 and above 70
Venezuela 1925 All 34
Canada 1861 All 82.5
United States 1870 10 and above 80
(88.5, 21.1)
1910 10 and above 92.3
(95.0, 69.5)
Source: Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002).
Note: In the United States, the ﬁgures for whites and nonwhites, respectively, are reported
within parentheses.
20. See the discussion in Phillips (1957).
21. Indeed, no signiﬁcant steps at all were taken in this direction until the 1870s, when the
British Colonial Oﬃce, perhaps spurred by several important expansions of public provision
of elementary education in Great Britain itself (such as the 1870 Education Act) began pro-
moting schooling in the colonies.born Argentines was less than that of nonwhites in the United States at
1900. These societies began to boost their investments in public schooling
at roughly the same time that they intensiﬁed their eﬀorts to attract mi-
grants from Europe. While this association might be interpreted as provid-
ing for the socialization of foreign immigrants, it is also consistent with the
idea that elites were inclined to extend access to opportunities as part of an
eﬀort to attract increasingly scarce labor from Europe, for which they were
directly or indirectly competing. The latter perspective is supported by the
observation that major investments in public schooling did not generally
occur in any Latin American country until the national governments pro-
vided the funds. In stark contrast to the pattern in North America, local
and state governments in Latin America proved reluctant to take on this
responsibility on their own. Nowhere in this latter region were high levels
of literacy achieved until well into the twentieth century.
What accounts for these patterns? Although diﬀerences in resources, or
per capita income, must certainly play a role in their explanation, it seems
likely that the greater inequality that prevailed in Latin America and in the
British colonies in the West Indies likely exacerbated the collective-action
problems associated with the establishment and funding of universal public
schools, because the distribution of the beneﬁts to establishing a broad sys-
tem of public schools would have been quite diﬀerent from the incidence of
taxes that would have been necessary to ﬁnance them. Where the wealthy
enjoyed disproportionate political power, they were able to procure school-
ing services for their own children and to resist being taxed to underwrite
or subsidize services to others. Although the children of the elite may have
been well schooled in such polities, few other children were so fortunate.
Land policy is yet another important example of how diﬀerences in the ex-
tent of political and economic inequality across societies may have inﬂuenced
the evolution of strategic institutions. Virtually all the societies in the Ameri-
cas had ample supplies of public lands well into the nineteenth century and
beyond. Since the respective governments were regarded as the owners or cus-
todians of this resource, they could directly aﬀect the distribution of wealth,
as well as the pace of settlement for eﬀective production, by implementing
policies to control the availability of land, set prices, establish minimum or
maximum acreages, provide credit for such purposes, and design tax systems.
The decisions about how to best employ these public resources were every-
where widely recognized as having an important bearing on how a society
would develop, and the subject of protracted political debates and struggles.
As we would expect of a country with relative equality and labor scar-
city, land policies in the United States never posed major obstacles to ac-
quiring land.22 The Homestead Act of 1862, which essentially made land
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22. For a comprehensive overview of U.S. land policy, see Gates (1968). For discussions of
Canadian land policy, see Solberg (1987), and Adelman (1994).free in plots suitable for family farms to all those who settled and worked
the land for a speciﬁed period, was perhaps the culmination of this institu-
tional orientation. Canada pursued similar policies: the Dominion Lands
Act of 1872 closely resembled the Homestead Act in both spirit and sub-
stance. Argentina, however, opted for a very diﬀerent approach. Despite
the support of some leaders (such as President Sarmiento) for land policies
modeled on the United States and Canadian practices, Argentina chose in-
stead to dispose of public lands by making grants of large blocs of land, at
ﬁrst to individuals and later to private development companies. Given that
private agents with control of vast land holdings, especially in this setting,
would be expected to set higher prices for land than public authorities fo-
cused on broad access, it is perhaps not surprising that the Argentine pro-
grams were much less successful at getting land to smallholders than those
in the United States and Canada.23
Argentina, Canada, and the United States all had an extraordinary abun-
dance of public lands to transfer to private hands, but the issues and cir-
cumstances facing policymakers in societies such as Mexico, with large in-
digenous populations, were very diﬀerent. Good land was relatively scarce.
Here the lands in question had long been worked by communities of Native
Americans, but without individual private property rights. Mexico was not
unique in pursuing policies, especially in the ﬁnal decades of the nineteenth
and the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century, that had the eﬀect of confer-
ring ownership of much of this land in large tracts on non-Native American
landholders.24The 1856 Ley Lerdo and the 1857 Constitution had set down
methods of privatizing these public lands in a manner that could originally
have been intended to help Native American farmers enter a national land
market and commercial economy. Under the regime of Porﬁrio Díaz, how-
ever, these laws became the basis for a series of new statutes and policies that
eﬀected a massive transfer of such lands (over 10.7 percent of the national
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23. For detailed discussions of the evolution of policies in Argentina, and comparisons with
what happened in Canada, see Solberg (1987) and Adelman (1994). The latter makes a num-
ber of interesting arguments for why the outcome in Argentina was rather diﬀerent from that
of Canada (as well as in the United States). First, the elites of Buenos Aires, whose interests
favored keeping scarce labor in the province, if not the capital city, were much more eﬀective
at weakening or blocking programs than were their urban counterparts in North America.
Even those policies nominally intended to broaden access tended to involve large grants to
land developers (with the logic that allocative eﬃciency could best be achieved through ex-
changes between private agents) or transfers to occupants who were already using the land
(including those who were grazing livestock). They thus generally conveyed public lands to
private owners in much larger and concentrated holdings than did the policies of the United
States and Canada. Second, the processes by which large landholdings might have broken up
in the absence of scale economies may have operated very slowly in Argentina: once the land
was in private hands, the potential value of land in grazing may have set too high a ﬂoor on
land prices for immigrants and other ordinary, would-be farmers to manage, especially given
the underdevelopment of mortgage and ﬁnancial institutions more generally. Moreover, live-
stock production increased dramatically during the late nineteenth century, and scale econ-
omies in the raising of livestock may have helped maintain the large estates.
24. For further discussion of Mexico, see McBride (1923), Tannenbaum (1929), and
Holden (1994).territory) between 1878 and 1908 to large holders such as survey and land
development companies, either in the form of outright grants for services
rendered by the companies or for prices set by decree.
In table 3.3, we present estimates for these four countries of the fractions
of household heads, or a near equivalent, that owned land in agricultural
areas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The ﬁgures indi-
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Table 3.3 Landholding in rural regions of Mexico, the United States, Canada, and
Argentina, c. 1900
Proportion of household 

































Source: Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002).
aLandownership is deﬁned as follows: in Mexico, household heads who own land; in the
United States, farms that are owner operated; in Canada, total occupiers of farmlands who
are owners; and in Argentina, the ratio of landowners to the number of males between the
ages of 18 and 50.
bThe Maritime region includes Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island.cate enormous diﬀerences across the countries in the prevalence of land
ownership among adult males in rural areas. On the eve of the Mexican
Revolution, the ﬁgures from the 1910 census suggest that only 2.4 percent
of household heads in rural Mexico owned land. The number is astound-
ingly low. The dramatic land policy measures in Mexico at the end of the
nineteenth century may have succeeded in privatizing most of the public
lands, but they left the vast majority of the rural population without any
land ownership at all. The evidence obviously conforms well with the idea
that in societies that began with extreme inequality, such as Mexico, insti-
tutions evolved so as to greatly advantage the elites.
In contrast, the proportion of adult males that owned land in rural areas
was quite high in the United States, at just below 75 percent in 1900. Al-
though the prevalence of land ownership was markedly lower in the South,
where blacks were disproportionately concentrated, the overall picture is
one of rather broad access to this fundamental type of economic resource.
Canada had an even better record, with nearly 90 percent of household
heads owning the agricultural lands they occupied in 1901. The estimates
of landholding in these two countries support the notion that land policies
made a diﬀerence, especially when compared to those for frontier areas in
Argentina.25 Nevertheless, all of these countries were far more eﬀective
than Mexico in making land ownership available to the general popula-
tion. This evidence on how land policies evolved provides yet another sup-
port to our view that the initial extent of inequality inﬂuenced the way in
which strategic institutions evolved across the societies of the Americas.
3.3 Tax Systems in Latin America and North America 
in the Nineteenth Century
The colonial tax structures established by the Europeans in the Ameri-
cas were generally alike in obtaining much of their revenue from trade or
closely related activities. Great Britain levied relatively light tax burdens on
the residents of its colonies. Revenues came from regulation of trade and
from the taxes it imposed on the importation into Britain of New World-
produced commodities such as sugar and tobacco. Given that the demand
for these goods was likely highly inelastic, British consumers likely bore
most of the burden of these duties. When Britain attempted to increase tax
revenues to oﬀset more of the costs of defending its colonies on the North
American mainland through excise taxes, import duties, and higher fees,
the change in policy was ﬁercely and famously resisted.26
98 Kenneth L. Sokoloﬀ and Eric M. Zolt
25. We are not able at this time to provide estimates of land ownership rates in all provinces
of Argentina, but would expect higher rates in the frontier regions we report than in the coun-
try at large.
26. See Brewer (1990). For excellent discussions of how Britain and Spain collected revenue
from its colonies, and of how local authorities in their colonies raised revenue, see Gipson
(1936), Perkins (1980, 1994), and Elliott (2006).Spain and Portugal, in contrast, were much more intent on, and eﬀective
at, raising revenue directly from the colonies. This was at least partly at-
tributable to the enormous wealth their colonies possessed. The Spanish
Crown levied a vast range of taxes, with revenue derived from impositions
on a variety of activities, commodities, commercial and administrative
transactions, and from tribute exacted from Native Americans varying
across colonies and districts with the composition of the economy and of
the population. In general, however, most of the revenues seem to have
come from taxes on the sales of various commodities (the alcabala), cus-
tom duties, mining (especially silver and gold production), and from vari-
ous state monopolies in tobacco, salt, and other commodities.27
In Brazil, the sugar industry was the primary source of revenue to Por-
tugal during the colony’s early history, but direct taxes on sugar production
hampered the competitiveness of Brazilian producers as sugar cultivation
spread across the West Indies.28 By the end of the sixteenth century Portu-
gal introduced new taxes on imports into Brazil, as well as sales taxes on
goods exported by Brazil to Portugal. The diversiﬁcation of taxes, and the
eventual boom in gold production (another activity ripe for taxation), con-
tributed to a relative, if gradual, decline in the burden on the sugar indus-
try. Taxation of trade, or of production of commodities intended for ex-
port, however, was to remain a central feature of the tax system.
Although the various taxes levied by the British Crown on the residents
of their colonies were relatively light, the local and provincial governments
set up by the colonists themselves seem to have raised more revenues from
their populations (at least those segments that were not Native Americans)
than did their counterparts in Latin America. This pattern both reﬂected
and contributed to a more decentralized structure of British America.
These taxes allowed local or colonial governments greater autonomy in
how they operated. The New England colonies exhibited a preference for
property or faculty taxes (based on estimated earnings potential) at both
the colonial and local government levels rather early in their histories, and
indeed in 1634 the General Court of Massachusetts held that “in all rates
and publique charges,” every man should be taxed “according to his
estate.” The expenses of the provincial governments were quite modest,
generally consisting of the bare necessities of civil government, but lo-
cal authorities used their revenues to support investments in quasi-
public or public goods and services such as public schools and roads. In con-
trast, the southern colonies, perhaps inﬂuenced by the interests of large
landowners (as well as the inelastic demand for some of their prominent
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27. For example, in Mexico during the late 1780s about a quarter of the colonial govern-
ment’s revenue came from the alcabala,nearly 45 percent from state monopolies, and roughly
20 percent from taxes on gold, silver, and other mining activities. See Tenenbaum (1986). The
relative importance of taxes on mining seems to have declined, and the relative importance of
the tobacco and other monopolies increased over time. See Burkholder and Johnson (1998).
28. Even municipal or local governments at times assessed taxes on sugar production.exports, such as tobacco), tended to rely more on taxing imports and ex-
ports. The Middle Atlantic colonies’ tax institutions fell somewhere in be-
tween, but already by the time of the Revolution both the Middle Atlan-
tic colonies and the New England colonies made extensive use of property
taxes.29
The reliance on taxes on trade as the principal source of tax revenue con-
tinued (at least at the national government level) throughout the hemi-
sphere after the wave of independence movements of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. In the United States, a 1789 law establish-
ing the tariﬀ was one of the ﬁrst laws enacted by the federal government.
Although the federal government had other sources of revenues, such as
excise taxes, proceeds from sales of public lands, a duty on receipts for lega-
cies, and even taxes (generally of brief duration and during wartime) on
dwelling houses, land, and slaves, tariﬀs provided by far the dominant
share (typically well above 80 percent) of national government revenue up
through the Civil War. These revenues amounted to roughly 1 to 2 percent
of GNP (except for spurts during wartime), and were almost exclusively
consumed in covering the costs of defense, paying oﬀ the debt, and of gen-
eral government expenses. Only a small fraction, about 5 percent of federal
government expenditures, went to support capital investments such as
public buildings, roads and canals, and improvements to rivers and har-
bors. As was recognized, and has often been noted, the U.S. government
was extremely conscientious about maintaining its reputation in ﬁnancial
markets, and was loath to ﬁnance much of its expenditures through bor-
rowing or issuance of paper money. In Canada, tariﬀs were the major
source of revenue for the national government after the confederation in
1867, generally accounting for between 60 and 70 percent of dominion rev-
enue (and over 80 percent of dominion tax revenue) into the twentieth cen-
tury.30
The overall patterns of national government taxation, if not of the extent
of reliance on debt, in Latin America were remarkably similar to that in the
United States and Canada over the nineteenth century. Although wars and
other shocks occasionally generated transitory impositions of, or increases
in, direct contributions(direct levies, applied to land or a proxy for income),
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29. See Perkins (1980) and for an exceptionally ﬁne treatment of how the tax structures of
the colony, commonwealth, and state of Massachusetts evolved from colonial times through
the early twentieth century (and the quotation from the order of the General Court; see Bul-
lock 1907, 2).
30. Together with excise taxes (levied primarily on liquors and tobacco), the revenue from
tariﬀs generally accounted for between 75 and 85 percent of dominion revenue. In 1870, the
tariﬀs on sugar and molasses, spirits and wine, tea, cottons, and woolens were the largest con-
tributors, jointly accounting for 65.8 percent of all tariﬀ revenue. See Perry (1955; table III).
Customs revenue had been the major source of provincial revenue before the Confederation,
but the terms of the uniﬁcation agreement stripped the provinces of the right to levy such
taxes.customs duties and excise taxes (on commodities such as liquors) normally
accounted for the bulk of revenues. Indeed, there were only two notable
diﬀerences in how Latin American central governments ﬁnanced them-
selves. First, unlike in the United States and Canada, state monopolies (a
holdover from the colonial period) and levies on the production of certain
staples and minerals intended for export (such as coﬀee, sugar, guano,
gold, silver, nitrates, and copper) were at times signiﬁcant generators of
revenue.31 The other salient divergence was the greater inclination of Latin
American countries to incur debt or issue paper money to ﬁnance operat-
ing deﬁcits.32 Notwithstanding these diﬀerences, Latin American central
governments were like the North American central governments in raising
most of their revenue from tariﬀs and from taxes levied on commodities
generally thought to be income inelastic. In Mexico, for example, port
taxes, income from the tobacco monopoly, and excise taxes yielded 75 to
85 percent of national government revenue over the latter half of the nine-
teenth century. Taxes on property and on businesses existed, but these typ-
ically accounted for less than 10 percent of revenue. In Brazil, between
1823 and 1888, more than 50 percent of total national revenue consistently
came from tariﬀs on imports, with excise taxes and assessments on exports
contributing roughly 14 and 25 percent of total revenue, respectively. In
Chile, taxes assessed at ports and revenue raised by state monopolies con-
sistently accounted for just under 80 percent of national government rev-
enue throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and well into the
twentieth century. Colombia provides yet another example. Already by the
1830s, soon after independence, customs duties and income from state
monopolies on commodities such as tobacco and salt brought in 60 per-
cent of national revenues. By the 1840s, their cumulative share rose to
nearly 80 percent.
Wars and other threats to the social order (such as the War of 1812, the
U.S. Civil War, the war between Mexico and the United States, and various
internal uprisings) did sometimes stimulate the imposition of direct taxes
that extended the reach of national governments in progressive directions
(i.e., the income tax in the United States during the Civil War, and the prop-
erty tax in Mexico during its war with the United States), but the general
Inequality and the Evolution of Institutions of Taxation 101
31. Most countries did collect some government revenue from duties on exports, but their
ability to rely on such taxes was constrained by international competition and the power of
exporters. It was generally only in cases where exporters had market power and could pass on
some signiﬁcant portion of taxes to the consumers (such as coﬀee in Brazil, guano in Peru, or
nitrates in Chile) that duties on exports accounted for substantial shares of national govern-
ment revenue.
32. Not only were Latin American countries more willing to borrow, but they also seem to
have been less committed to maintaining conﬁdence in their service of the debt. Their poor
record at debt service constrained their ability to tap external credit, and thus Latin Ameri-
can countries were typically quite reliant on internal sources. This may have had unfortunate
eﬀects on the development of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.pattern throughout the hemisphere was reliance by national governments
on taxes that targeted commodities or trade rather than income or
wealth.33 As is evident in table 3.4, and discussed in more detail in section
four, it was only in the twentieth century that national governments in the
United States, Canada, and Latin American countries introduced perma-
nent peacetime taxes on income and wealth (including estates and gifts).34
Stark contrasts existed across the societies of the Americas, however, in
the size and revenue sources of state/provincial and local governments. Lo-
cal governments were far more prominent in the United States and Canada
than in Latin America (see table 3.5), and this feature is of fundamental im-
portance because of the radically diﬀerent tax instruments used by state
and local governments as compared to those of the national governments.
A predisposition of the North American populations to organize and sup-
port local governments was evident as early as the seventeenth century,
despite the absence during that era of distinctively  high per capita incomes
(as compared to other societies in the Americas). Likewise distinctive was
the tendency of these governments to raise the vast majority of revenue
through property taxes.
Local governments certainly grew very rapidly in the United States dur-
ing the early decades of the nineteenth century as the common school move-
ment progressed, and there were substantial investments in building roads
and other infrastructure demanded by an early industrializing economy.
Indeed, they were the largest component of the overall government sector
throughout the nineteenth century (with a share of total government rev-
enue of 57.1 percent in 1855, for example), with only a few brief exceptions
intervals during and after major wars. Their heavy reliance on the property
tax (see table 3.6) suggests that a rather progressive tax structure prevailed
among local governments, and given the relative prominence of this level
of government, in the overall government sector as well.
For example, between 1861 and 1905, property taxes accounted for be-
tween 76 and 87 percent of all the tax revenue collected by the state and
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33. A close examination of the variation over time in the amounts of tax revenue raised, and
the manner by which national governments in Latin America ﬁnanced their operations, sug-
gests that there was often a reluctance to increase taxes during periods of war. Rather, the ap-
proach seemed to be either inﬂating the money supply or borrowing from foreign lenders or
domestic banks. This pattern stands in stark contrast to the behavior of the U.S. government
during wartime, but it is interesting to note the resemblance to how the Confederacy ﬁnanced
its operations during the U.S. Civil War. In her intriguing article, which explores the voting
patterns among members of the Confederate Congress, Rose Razaghian ﬁnds that it was
those that came from the states and districts with large slave plantations (and likely the great-
est inequality) that were (until the very late stages of the war) most opposed to taxing in-
come—and thus most inclined toward ﬁnancing the Confederacy through inﬂationary mon-
etary policy, loans, and excise taxes. See Razaghian (2005).
34. These new assessments, together with payroll taxes, came to be the dominant source of
revenue—especially in the United States and Canada—during the 1930s and 1940s, and co-
incided with a sharp increase in the size of the central governments.Table 3.4 The shares of national government revenue accounted for by tariﬀs and excise taxes,
and by taxes on income and wealth (%)
Income and  Income and































Sources: The general source for the estimates is Mitchell (1993), but the estimates reported by Mitchell
were interpreted with, and complemented by, the greater detail obtained for a number of individual
countries in other sources. For Argentina, Oﬁcina de Estadistica Nacional (1875). For Brazil, Carreira
(1889), and Fundação Instituto Brasileiro (1999). For Chile, Molina (1898). For Colombia, Melo-
Gonzalez (1989); Park (1985); and López Garavito (1992). For Costa Rica, Guell (1975); Ministerio de
Economia y Hacienda (1953); and Román (1995). For Mexico, Marichal, Miño Grijalva, and Riguzzi
(1994). For Peru, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio (1928 and 1940); and Tantalean Arbulu (1983).
aThe revenue included under customs includes sales and excise taxes as well as customs.
bThe estimates of customs revenue for 1870 through 1910 include the amounts collected from indirect
taxes (almost exclusively levies on imports and exports), as well as revenue from stamps (the major com-
ponent), ports, the post oﬃce, lotteries, railroads, and coinage. The income and wealth ﬁgures for those
years encompass indirect taxes, most of which are taxes on property held in districts under the federal
government authority. The share in total revenue accounted for by indirect taxes trends from 72.7 per-
cent in 1870 to 50.8 in 1890 to 44.4 percent in 1910.
cThe revenues reported under customs revenue include tariﬀs on imports, a tax on coﬀee exports, sales
or excise taxes (mostly composed of a levy on tobacco consumption until 1908), and revenue obtained
from the state monopoly on liquors.




























1940 5.8 43.0Table 3.5 Distribution of tax revenues across levels of government during the
nineteenth century: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Canada, and the
United States (%)
National Provincial  Municipalities 
Country/Year government governments or other local
Brazil
1826 30.8 69.2 0.0
1856 79.5 17.1 3.3
1860 78.2 18.2 3.5






1839 88.4 2.9 8.7
1842 91.8 1.6 6.7
1850 85.4 8.7 5.8
1870 46.6 30.8 22.6
1894 60.0 32.0 8.0
1898 66.7 28.6 4.8
Mexico
1882 69.1 19.5 11.5
1890 74.7 16.3 9.0
1900 67.3 19.8 12.9
1908 70.6 17.1 12.3
Canada
1933 42.5 17.9 39.6
United States
1855 25.5 17.4 57.1
1875 39.6 16.4 44.0
1895 36.0 14.0 50.0
1913 29.1 13.2 57.6
1927 35.5 18.0 46.5
Notes: For Brazil, see Carreira (1889). The substantial change in the distribution of tax rev-
enues between 1826 and 1856 reﬂects the growth in the relative power of the national govern-
ment, relative to the provinces, after independence. There were explicit divisions of authority
across the levels of government as regards what could be taxed, but those divisions changed
somewhat over time. In 1834, the national government was given the authority to raise rev-
enue through collecting taxes on imports, exports, slaves, and the production of gold, sugar,
cotton, and various other products, as well as through port fees, stamp requirements, and the
sale of oﬃcial posts and titles. The division of authority changed over time, with perhaps the
principal impact being the shift of taxes on slaves to provinces, with the right to tax immobile
property going to the national government.
For Colombia, see Melo-Gonzalez (1989). As seen in the table, in the 1830s and 1840s, the
national government collected a major part of the ﬁscal revenues. The situation changed dras-
tically after the reform of 1850, which intended to decentralize ﬁscal revenues and spending.
The states would be in charge of the elaboration of their own budgets. In the case of revenues,
the national government would keep mainly the revenues from customs, salt monopoly,
stamped paper, income from the mint, and the postal and telegraph service, while the states
would collect the revenues from taxes on the gross value of the production of gold and certain
agricultural commodities. These taxes were phased out during mid-century, however, and the local governments in Massachusetts.35 The contours of public ﬁnance, as
regards both the prominence of local governments and the importance of
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Table 3.5 (continued)
states created new taxes then, such as a direct tax, in order to raise more revenues. Not only
taxation was decentralized: spending was also reallocated. The states were put in charge of
the spending on public instruction, police, prisons, justice administration, roads, and public
works. Between 1863 and 1886 the decentralization process became more signiﬁcant. The
Constitution of 1863 established the federal system in the Estados Unidos de Colombia
(United States of Colombia), which was conﬁrmed by nine sovereign states: Antioquia, Bolí-
var, Boyacá, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Magdalena, Panamá, Santander, and Tolima. The de-
centralization of revenues had a signiﬁcant impact: while in 1850 the revenues collected by
states represented 8.7 percent of total revenues, in 1870 they represented 30 percent. In the
case of the municipalities, their revenues also increased in importance from 6 percent to 23
percent between 1850 and 1870. It is important to notice that Antioquia and Cundinamarca,
the two states that realized the most growth over the period in both income and state tax rev-
enue, had been characterized by relative labor scarcity and likely had greater equality.
For Canada, see J. Harvey Perry (1955): appendix C, table 1.
For the United States, the ﬁgures for 1855, 1875, and 1895, were computed as a weighted
average of regional estimates of per capita revenue raised for diﬀerent levels of government.
The federal ﬁgures include revenue raised through land sales. See Lance E. Davis and John
Legler (1966). The estimates for 1913, 1927, and 1950, see U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001).
Table 3.6 Sources of tax revenue for U.S. local governments, 1890–1950
Taxes 1890 1902 1913 1927 1940 1950
Income 0.4 0.9
Sales and excise 0.2 0.6 2.8 5.9
Property 92.5 88.6 91.0 96.8 91.3 86.2
Payroll 0.2 0.6 1.5 2.3
Other 7.5 11.4 8.6 2.1 3.9 4.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: For the 1890 estimates, see Morris A. Copeland (1961). Copeland also provides ex-
tensive discussion, as well as estimates that conform with those presented in Sidney Ratner
(1980), table 1. We employ Ratner for the estimates after 1890, as this source covers the years
up to 1950. The estimates represent the share of local government tax revenues accounted for
by the respective taxes. Transfers of resources to local governments accounted for less than
10 percent of total resources available for local government expenditures through 1913 (and
most of those transfers were grants for schools or roads), rose to a bit less than 15 percent by
1932, but jumped to more than 25 percent by the early 1940s.
35. These ﬁgures (computed from data reported in Bullock (1907; 135) are all the more
striking, because the state of Massachusetts depended much more on taxing corporations
than did most other states. Moreover, the implication of the ﬁgures in Bullock (1907; 127,
135), is that property taxes accounted for more than 90 percent of the tax revenue raised by
local governments in that state between 1880 and 1900, if not before as well. We do not yet
have evidence from many states on the shares of revenue to local governments coming from
diﬀerent taxes earlier in the nineteenth century, but scattered information is consistent with
the implication of the estimate for 1902 in table 3.6, that local governments obtained well over
90 percent of revenue from property taxes. See Wallis (2001) for further discussion of how the
relative importance of the property tax as a source of state revenue varied over the nineteenth
century.property taxes to them appear to have been much the same in Canada. Our
earliest estimate is that property taxes accounted for over 82 percent of lo-
cal government revenue in 1913 (see table 3.7), but less comprehensive in-
formation suggests that the share of tax revenue accounted for by levies on
property may have been even greater during the nineteenth century, espe-
cially in Ontario.36
State governments in the United States and provincial governments in
Canada generally represented relatively small parts of their respective ag-
gregate government sectors during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries—at least as measured by share of tax revenues. In neither coun-
try did state/provincial governments account for more than 20 percent of
aggregate government tax revenues before the 1920s. They diﬀered, how-
ever, in how they obtained revenues to ﬁnance their expenditures. Even af-
ter the confederation of Canadian provinces in 1867, provincial govern-
ments in Canada raised most of their revenues from either subsidies or
transfers from the Dominion (whose revenues came primarily from tariﬀs
or excise duties) or from assessments levied on mining, cutting timber, and
other exploitation of natural resources. It was only after the scale of pro-
vincial programs increased, inspired by rapid population and economic
growth on the eve of the twentieth century, that provincial governments
enacted new levies, such as taxes on corporations, property, and succession
duties, to increase their revenues. These measures did not raise substantial
amounts, however, and as late as the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century,
they generally yielded less than a quarter of provincial revenue.
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Table 3.7 Sources of revenue for Canada’s municipal governments, 1913–1950 (%)
Revenue 1913 1933 1950
Income taxes 1.4
Sales and excise taxes 4.3
Property/Wealth taxes 82.2 78.6 69.6
Other taxes 6.0 6.1 9.2
Nontax revenues 11.8 13.9 14.3
Subsidies from other governments 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistics Canada (1983, Series H 52–74).
36. See Perry (1955), especially chapters 2, 5, and 12. Perry ﬁnds that property taxes played
an important role in the development of municipal or local governments. These taxes were ex-
tensively used in upper Canada during the early nineteenth century. Indeed, Perry suggests
that virtually wherever in Canada signiﬁcant municipal government developed, the property
tax was the dominant source of revenue. Property taxes were less important in Quebec than
Ontario, because French Canada was able to obtain substantial revenue from customs fees and
statutory road levies. Property taxes were also low in the Maritime Provinces (especially Nova
Scotia) because of the limited development of local government in that region. Perry attributes
the limited development of local government there to the heterogeneity of the population.The state governments in the United States made much more use of di-
rect taxes than their counterparts in Canada, and indeed overall relied
heavily on property taxes both early and late in the nineteenth century.37
The property tax was likely the largest single source of state government
revenue in the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but
the onset of industrialization opened up or improved alternative means of
states raising funds. By the 1820s and 1830s, state governments began to re-
duce or even eliminate property taxes, as more and more revenues rolled in
from other sources, including fees assessed for issuing corporate charters,
taxes on corporate capital (especially banks and insurance companies),
and returns on investments they had made to stoke development in various
banks, transportation companies, and other infrastructure. When the eco-
nomic contractions of the late 1830s and early 1840s sharply curtailed
these sources of revenue, however, many state governments found them-
selves on (or over) the brink of bankruptcy. These ﬁscal challenges com-
pelled them to revive their property taxes and/or design other relatively
stable revenue sources, which were particularly crucial if they hoped to is-
sue debt for the ﬁnancing of additional investments in infrastructure. Al-
though states were creative in devising a wide variety of alternative meth-
ods of raising revenue, property taxes were restored to being the most
important tax revenue source for state governments by the end of the nine-
teenth century (roughly 70 percent of tax revenue in 1890; see table 3.8).
Given the very large size of the local governments in the United States
and Canada, and their heavy reliance on property and wealth taxes into
the twentieth century, it should perhaps not be surprising that these same
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37. Another direct tax sometimes levied by state governments in the United States was the
poll tax, but the signiﬁcance of poll taxes as a revenue source diminished greatly over the nine-
teenth century.
Table 3.8 Sources of tax revenue for U.S. state governments, 1890–1950 (%)
Tax revenue 1890 1902 1913 1927 1940 1950
Individual income 4.0 4.7 7.4
Corporate income 5.3 3.5 6.0
Sales and excise a 17.9 19.9 42.8 51.0 55.6
Property 70.0 52.6 46.5 21.2 5.9 3.1
Payroll 7.9 24.5 18.8
Death and gift 29.5 33.6 18.9 10.3 9.1
Other 30.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes:See the note to table 3.6. The estimates represent the share of state government tax rev-
enues accounted for by the respective taxes. Nontax revenues appear to have been substan-
tial, however, accounting perhaps for as much as 40 percent of revenue in 1913.
aThe sales and gross receipts taxes for 1890 are included in the Other category.taxes loom large when one considers the total tax revenue collected by gov-
ernments at all levels. For the United States, in both 1902 and 1913 (see
table 3.9), property, gift, and estate taxes account for between 60 and 70
percent of the revenue to the overall government sector. Although our es-
timates for Canada do not extend that far back (see table 3.10), it is clear
that there, too—largely due to the prominence of local or municipal gov-
ernments—taxes on property and wealth were very important sources of
revenue for the government sector overall (nearly 40 percent as late as
1933). Even if the respective levels of government in Latin America relied
on the same tax instruments as did their counterparts to the north, the fact
that local governments were so much smaller implies that property and
wealth holders would contribute a relatively modest proportion of govern-
ment revenue overall. Local/municipal authorities accounted for only
about 10 percent of total government tax revenue in Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico throughout the nineteenth century (and in Chile, between 10 and
20 percent during the second decade of the twentieth century, despite the
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Table 3.10 Sources of revenue in Canada, for all levels together, 1933–1950 (%)
Revenue 1933 1950
Income taxes 12.4 44.5
Sales and excise taxes 26.2 32.0
Customs duties 13.5 7.9
Property/Wealth taxes 39.2 10.8
Other taxes 8.7 4.8
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistics Canada (1983, Series H 52–74).
Table 3.9 Sources of tax revenue in the United States, for all levels together,
1902–1950 (%)
Tax revenue 1902 1913 1927 1940 1950
Individual income 9.8 8.1 29.3
Corporate income 1.5 13.9 8.7 19.6
Sales and excise 19.8 16.1 13.2 28.5 23.6
Customs duties 17.7 13.6 6.0 2.3 0.7
Property 51.4 58.6 48.8 30.3 13.0
Payroll 0.1 2.4 13.3 9.7
Death and gift 11.1 10.1 5.8 8.9 4.2
Other
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ratner (1980), table 1.
Note: The estimates represent the share of total government tax revenue (national, state, and
local considered together) accounted for by the respective taxes.absence of state/provincial governments). The contrast with the United
States and Canada is dramatic. In the United States, local governments
generated 57.1 percent of total government tax revenue in 1855, and the
ﬁgure remained near 50 percent for the rest of the century. Even as late as
the 1930s, the share of local government revenue was near 40 percent in
both the United States and Canada.
From the exceedingly modest investments in public schooling charac-
teristic of Latin America into the twentieth century (and reﬂected in the
low literacy rates that prevailed throughout the region until national gov-
ernments became more aggressive in promoting public schooling) the
qualitative pattern evident in the ﬁgures for Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico
seems to be representative.38Local/municipal governments in Latin Amer-
ican countries never grew very large, especially in rural areas and where
Native Americans composed larger proportions of the population. The ba-
sis for our claim that during the nineteenth century the overall tax struc-
tures in the United States and Canada were much more progressive (in the
sense of placing more of the burden on wealthy elites) than in Latin Amer-
ica, however, does not rest solely on the relative sizes of the diﬀerent levels
of government. The evidence on the relative use of tax instruments suggests
that local governments in Latin America relied much less on the property
tax than did their counterparts in the United States and Canada. Early in
the twentieth century, local governments in Chile and Colombia (see tables
3.11 and 3.12) raised less than half of their revenue from property and in-
come taxes (less than 25 percent in Cundinamarca, Colombia), while these
taxes were dominant in the accounts of Canada (78 percent) and the
United States (over 90 percent). When one considers these local govern-
ments in Latin America, as compared to even U.S. state governments
(which, as reported in table 3.7, were raising more than 80 percent of their
revenue from property, death, and gift taxes as late as 1913), the disincli-
nation of Latin American governments to tax property holders and the will
to do stands out in especially stark terms.
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38. See Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloﬀ (2002) for more discussion of the evolution of
schooling institutions in the Americas.
Table 3.11 Sources of revenue to Chile’s municipal governments (%)
Taxes/Fees Taxes  on 
Taxes on  on professions  alcoholic  Taxes on  Taxes on  Taxes on 
Year income and industries beverages slaughtering mines carriages Other
1913 39.0 7.1 6.0 4.0 2.1 3.0 38.8
1915 50.0 6.7 4.1 3.3 2.5 2.5 30.9
1920 38.7 15.7 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.4 36.1
Source: Oﬁcina Central de Estadistica Sinopsis Estadistica de la Republica de Chile (1921).The underdevelopment of local government in Latin America, where
both economic and political inequality was extreme and elites might have
been expected to resist the levying of property and wealth taxes to fund
broad provision of public services, raises the issue of whether the two con-
ditions are causally related to each other. A theoretical argument can cer-
tainly be made that elites might have had an interest in resisting the growth
of public services, especially those provided to segments of the population
that were perceived as quite unlike their own. This notion receives some
support from the observation that during the nineteenth century local gov-
ernments in the United States were relatively larger (as judged both by the
local government share of regional income as well as relative to the income
share of state income) in regions with less inequality such as the Midwest,
or even the Northeast (see table 3.13).
Not only were local governments much smaller in Latin American coun-
tries generally, but the state or provincial governments in that region made
less use of property taxes, and relied more on taxes that placed a lighter tax
burden on the elite. As reﬂected in tables 3.14 and 3.15, which present the
sources of revenue (in percentage terms) for all of the state or provincial
governments in Argentina and Colombia, and a sampling of them for
Brazil and Mexico at various points during the second half of the nine-
teenth century, taxes on land or property (the so-called direct contribu-
tions) accounted for markedly lower proportions of state government rev-
enue in Latin America than such taxes did in the United States. In these
four countries (the ﬁrst three of which are among the most decentralized in
Latin America), taxes on diﬀerent types of property or on business rarely
accounted for more than 10 to 15 percent (and generally less) of state/
provincial revenue, as compared to 70 percent in the United States in 1890.
Instead, state/provincial governments in Latin America relied on excise
taxes (such as on liquors, tobacco, ﬂour, slaughtered livestock, and foreign
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Table 3.12 Sources of revenue to Colombia’s municipal governments in the
Department of Cundinamarca, 1918 (%)
Total for all municipalities  City of 
Revenue in Cundinamarca Bogota alone
Property tax 22.5 14.2
Almotacen and plaza (tax on market) 11.7 15.0
Taxes on slaughtering 5.7 4.0
Bullﬁghting and other legal games 1.7 1.0
Rental income 1.2 0.1
Fines 2.7 1.6
Other sources 54.5 64.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Republica de Colombia (1919).merchandise), tolls on roads and other modes of transportation, ﬁnes and
various fees for government services, levies on products intended largely
for export (such as coﬀee in Brazil), and a variety of other sources. Al-
though patterns of incidence are not always transparent, the methods of
raising revenue to fund the operations of state and provincial governments
in Latin America would generally be expected to impose a proportionally
rather light burden on the wealthy classes.
In Brazil, for example, the allocation of taxing authority between the
provinces and the national government changed several times over the
nineteenth century. Under the 1840 constitution, the main provincial taxes
were taxes on sugar and coﬀee production, but revenues were also obtained
from taxes/fees on legacies and inheritance, on transference of properties,
the sale of novhos e velhos direitos (oﬃcial posts and titles), taxes on the
slave trade, and especially fees for traveling along provincial roads and
rivers. Taxes on property generated only a tiny share of total revenue. Un-
til relatively late in the nineteenth century, the fees charged for traveling on
provincial roads (estradas provinciais) and internal/small rivers (rios inter-
nos)—fees that were called by diﬀerent names such as itinerary fees, fees on
departure or fees on traveling—were among the most important sources of
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Table 3.13 Local and state taxes, as shares of income, by region in the United
States, 1860 and 1880
Percent Percent  Per  capita 
Year/Region state taxes local taxes income (1860$)
1860
Northeast 0.91 3.65 181
North central 1.25 6.22 89
South Atlantic 2.21 3.07 81
East south central 1.12 1.79 89
West south central 0.68 2.20 184
National average 1.22 2.58 128
1880
Northeast 0.93 4.08 244
North central 0.84 4.40 170
South Atlantic 2.04 3.33 84
East south central 1.23 1.97 95
West south central 0.97 4.31 112
National average 0.90 3.97 173
Source: Both the regional and national average shares of state and local revenues in regional
were calculated from the estimates of government receipts in Davis and Legler (1966), and the
per capita income estimates in Robert W. Fogel (1988).
Notes:We do not include estimates for the national government as a share of income, because
the receipt is based on point of collection, and thus implies higher taxes in regions with ports
or substantial land sales. However, our estimates of the national ﬁgures for the total tax rev-
enue relative to income are 6.67 and 8.96 percent in 1860 and 1880, respectively. Some of the
later-settled regions are excluded here because of incomplete information.provincial revenues. For example, in the province of São Paulo in the pe-
riod 1871–72, the rights to departure raised 56 percent of the total revenues
of the province, while the taxation on slavery trade and the tax on legacies
accounted for 6 percent and 8 percent, respectively. In the province of
Minas Geraes, in 1876 the main sources of provincial revenue were taxes
on coﬀee (20 percent of the total revenues of the province), itinerary fees
(16 percent), and taxes on transfer, registration, and trade of slaves (15
percent).
Direct taxes did not become important until late in the nineteenth cen-
tury, but even then the reliance in Brazil on property and other taxes pro-
gressive in character was quite modest compared to the United States. The
Constitution of 1891 established a republic, and the provinces then became
designated states with expanded rights to collect taxes on exports (rights
previously reserved for the national government), as well as taxes on prop-
erty, on transference of property, and on industries and proﬁts. This
change transformed the tributary structure of the most prosperous states,
such as Minas Geraes, whose economies were largely directed at foreign
trade. In Minas Geraes, levies on exports had raised only 5 percent of the
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Table 3.14 Sources of revenue to state/provincial governments in Argentina and
Colombia, c. 1870 (%)
1872
Argentina
Revenue of the provincial governments
Direct contribution (taxes) 13.2
Constitution-mandated share of tariﬀ revenue 15.2
Other subvention from national treasury 9.7
Sales of land 30.5
Alcabala (sales tax) 0.2
Rent of land 0.2
Inheritances 0.1
Stamped paper, tolls, tax on fruit, and other miscellaneous 30.9
1870
Colombia
Revenue of the state governments
Direct taxes on industry and capital 11.7
Tax on real estate 7.1
Tax on slaughtered livestock 18.3
Tax on liquors 15.1
Tax on foreign merchandise 12.9
Excise taxes on cacao, tobacco, and anise 7.0
Stamps 5.7
Miscellaneous/Other 22.1
Source: For Argentina, Oﬁcina de Estadística Nacional (1875). For Colombia, López Gar-
avito (1992).Table 3.15 Sources of revenue to selected state/provincial governments in Brazil and Mexico, 




Taxes on exports 40.7
Transit fees/taxes 79.1 3.6
Tax/Fees on inheritances and property transfers 7.9 15.9
Taxes on property 1.2 2.0
Taxes on capital of producers 5.7
Taxes on slaves and slave trade 5.8
Taxes on water and sewers 8.4




Taxes on exports 5.7 64.4 59.0
Taxes on coﬀee, gold, salt, and diamonds 22.3 0.8 1.5
Transit fees/taxes 16.4 0.9 1.0
Tax/Fees on inheritances and property transfers 7.9 14.1 8.7
Transfer and registration of slaves 17.4
Taxes on property 2.8 6.1
Taxes on private consumption 7.6 2.3
Taxes on industries and proﬁts 8.0
Judiciary, state stamps, and other fees 1.0 8.2 4.9
Oﬃcial posts and titles 7.4 2.8




Income from public lands and sea salt ﬁelds 27.5
Taxes on liquors 14.6
Sales taxes on livestock and ﬂour 20.6
Taxes on imports 3.5
Transfer fees and ﬁnes 19.1
Other miscellaneous fees and taxes 14.6
Sources: For Brazil, in 1876 and 1892, Torres (1961), and for 1905, Barbosa (1966). For Mexico, Levy
(2005).
Notes: The relatively high ﬁgure for the miscellaneous/other category in Minas Geraes in 1876 is due to
9.9 percent of the revenue coming from “direitos de 6% sobre outros generos.” The high transit tax rev-
enue in Sao Paolo in 1871 is due primarily to the Taxas das Barreiras, which was a state road tax, whereby
stations on state roads collected tolls for carts, wagons, coaches, and animals on the hoof.total revenues of the province in 1889, but with the expanded power to tax,
this share jumped to 64 percent in 1892. Similarly, in 1910 the tax on ex-
ports raised 40 percent of the total revenues of São Paulo, whereas in 1871
it had yielded no revenue for the province.
The states also increased the shares of revenue they derived from taxes
on property, legacies and others transferences of property, and on indus-
trial proﬁts. In Minas Geraes, the tax on property (imposto predialor terri-
torial tax) accounted for 2.8 percent of the total revenues of the province
in 1876, but its take rose to 6.1 percent in 1905. There were no taxes on in-
dustries and proﬁts prior to the establishment of the republic, but they ac-
counted for 8 percent of revenue in 1905. Taxes and fees on inheritance and
transfers of property generated 8.7 percent of total revenues. Such taxes
were of similar importance in São Paulo. In 1910, the state of São Paulo
raised 2 percent of state revenue from property taxes, 5.7 percent of rev-
enue from a tax on the capital of producers, and 15.9 percent of revenues
from taxes/fees on inheritances, legacies, and transfers of property. Thus,
in Minas Geraes and São Paulo, perhaps the two major states of Brazil,
these progressive taxes accounted for 22.8 and 23.6 percent of state rev-
enue, respectively. As is evident in table 3.8, the corresponding ﬁgure for
state governments in the United States in 1902 was 82.1 percent. The con-
trast is dramatic and telling.
If it is indeed true that less reliance on taxation of property or wealth is
indicative of elites bearing a lighter tax burden, then the evidence does sus-
tain the idea that the tax institutions that characterized Latin America dur-
ing the nineteenth century were especially favorable to their interests. Not
only were the local authorities (which everywhere were more likely to tax
wealth than those at other levels of government) extremely stunted as re-
gards the scale of their activities (and demands for revenue), but both local
and state/provincial governments in Latin America made much less use of
property, wealth, or other taxes than did their counterparts in the North.
Of course, the burdens of taxation should not be assessed solely by the mix
of tax instruments applied to raise revenue, but also by the amount of rev-
enue raised. It might be argued, for example, that the United States and
Canada were generally more disposed toward government involvement,
and thus had a greater need to levy taxes.
One response to this sort of explanation of the comparatively small size
of local governments in Latin America is to point out that any bias against
governments in Latin America was obviously not neutral across levels of
government. The evidence is clear that the local governments in Latin
America were stunted relative to national governments, a pattern we ﬁnd
particularly interesting because local governments in virtually all contexts
seem to rely more on taxing wealth and property than other levels of gov-
ernment. We explore the issue further in table 3.16, where estimates of the
amount of national government taxes collected per capita in 1870, as well
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countries around the world. Perhaps not surprisingly, given its higher per
capita income, the U.S. national government collected substantial taxes on
a per capita basis. The only country in the Americas that collected more was
Peru, which realized extensive revenue over a period of several decades from
exports of guano—a natural resource that was all too soon depleted.39
Judged as a share of national income, however, the amount of revenue go-
ing to the national government was not at all high in the United States. On
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39. For a brief account of the rise and fall of this remarkably lucrative industry, see Mathew
(1976).
Table 3.16 National government tax revenue per capita, c. 1870
Taxes per capita  Index of tax revenue relative to 


























Sweden and Norway 3.7 51
Switzerland 2.0 20
Notes:The information on taxes per capita is from Lopez Garavito (1992, 202–203). The val-
ues of the index of tax revenue relative to national income were computed as the respective ra-
tios of the estimates of taxes per capita to the estimates of per capita income for 1870 con-
tained in Angus Maddison (1995). The index values are expressed relative to the U.S. value,
which was normalized to a standard of 100.the contrary, Argentina and Brazil (and undoubtedly Peru) raised far more
revenue for their respective central government, relative to national income,
than did the United States, and Mexico collected nearly as much.
Admittedly, if one considers the much larger share of total government
revenue that goes to local and state governments in the United States than
in Latin America, it is evident that the revenue going to the government
sector in the aggregate is far higher as a share of national income in the
United States than in any other country in the hemisphere with the excep-
tion of Brazil (and Peru, during the bonanza from guano), where the ratio
of total taxes to income (in the 7 to 8 percent range) seems roughly similar.
Nevertheless, the substantive point remains. It is not the case that the Latin
American countries were in general lightly taxed, but rather that that prop-
erty and wealth taxes, and the levels of government that were more reliant
on these sources of revenue, during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries especially, were of minor signiﬁcance, by the standards of their
neighbors in North America, in the structure and ﬁnancing of government.
The striking contrast we have highlighted is consistent with our conjec-
ture that the legacy of extreme inequality in Latin America encouraged a
distinctly diﬀerent path of evolution of tax institutions and/or government
structures among the societies of the Americas over the nineteenth century.
One alternative hypothesis of this pattern, however, is that the reluctance
or inability to tax property and wealth in Latin America was due to condi-
tions characteristic of less developed economies that made it diﬃcult to ad-
minister such levies. There may indeed be some merit to this type of expla-
nation, but we would emphasize how the colonies in the northern part of
North America, such as those in New England and the Middle Atlantic,
made eﬀective use of these sorts of instruments for raising tax revenue in
support of local and state governments as early as the seventeenth century.
It seems unlikely that these latter polities could be considered more devel-
oped than many of the nineteenth century Latin America nations. Other
possible rationales are that the Latin American societies may have had less
demand for the sorts of public goods and services that were provided by lo-
cal governments, or that they simply chose to satisfy that demand through
national government programs. These interesting theories deserve further
study, but it is worth noting that Latin American societies were character-
ized by low rates of investment in public schools (and the low literacy rates
that accompanied them) well into the twentieth century (if not the present
day), even after accounting for their levels of per capita income.40 More-
over, even if a radically diﬀerent demand for public services, such as
schools, does explain the patterns in the size of local governments and in
government revenue sources, might this be considered yet another mecha-
nism by which extreme inequality impacts on the institutions of taxation?
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40. See Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloﬀ (2002), as well as De Ferranti et al. (2004).3.4 Tax Systems in the Twentieth Century
Throughout the Americas, the size of the government sector grew sub-
stantially over the twentieth century, and major changes in the tax struc-
tures were introduced to fund the increase in government expenditures.
But in some respects, much has remained the same. As compared to the
United States and Canada, Latin American governments continue to be
highly centralized, and to generally rely on consumption taxes instead of
taxes on wealth, income (especially those of individuals), or other levies
that place a serious burden on elites. Indeed, most observers judge the pro-
gressivity of Latin American tax (and expenditure) programs to be re-
markably modest, especially in light of the extreme inequality prevailing in
that region of the world.41
3.4.1 Developments in the United States and Canada
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the U.S. federal, state, and
local governments together accounted for only about 7 percent of GDP.
Even by 1930, they had grown to no more than 10 percent. During the De-
pression and World War II, however, the size of the government sector ex-
ploded, to roughly 25–30 percent of the economy, with the federal govern-
ment coming to assume the dominant role it plays today.42 In Canada,
similar developments took place.43 Most of the major tax changes at the
U.S. and Canadian federal levels were related to the need to ﬁnance the
higher level of expenditures associated with the conduct of World Wars I
and II, but in both countries the expanded revenues were tapped in the af-
termath of those conﬂicts to support the peacetime growth of the national
governments (Brownlee 1996). Facilitated by the passage of the constitu-
tional amendment in 1913 that cleared away legal obstacles to a federal in-
dividual income tax (which followed the passage of a corporate income tax
in 1909), the relative tax and spending shares between the federal and state
and local governments began to shift. The ﬁscal landscape changed further
with the adoption of social security taxes in 1937.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the individual income tax in the
United States replaced the property tax as the primary tax on individuals.44
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41. This discussion relies on several excellent cross-country studies of tax systems in Latin
America as well as Government Finance Statistics from the International Monetary Fund.
See Bird (1992, 2003), Shome (1999), Tanzi (2000), Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2002), and In-
ternational Monetary Fund (2001, 2004).
42. See Steuerle (2004); and Slemrod and Bakija (1996). See also Weisman (2002).
43. See Treﬀ and Perry (2004), at http://www.ctf.ca/FN2003/ﬁnances2003.asp
44. It is interesting that when Congress required additional revenue during the War of 1812,
the solution was a supplemental property tax collected through a direct assessment of the
states. By the time of the Civil War, funding the revenue needs of war ﬁnancing through prop-
erty taxation had less political appeal. See Brownlee (1996) and Weisman (2002) for more dis-
cussion.The federal government ﬁrst adopted an income tax during the 1860s, fol-
lowing the British approach for raising funds to ﬁnance the Crimean War.
After the Civil War, the income tax was subject to political attacks and was
eliminated, restored, and then struck down on constitutional grounds. Fol-
lowing the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, however, the Un-
derwood-Simmons Tariﬀ Act reestablished the income tax in a less pro-
gressive and less ambitious form than the Civil War version or the 1894
legislation.45The scope of the individual income tax was changed greatly by
the revenue demands associated with the world wars. For example, in the
United States, the number of individual income taxpayers grew from 3.9
million in 1939 to 42.6 million in 1945, and tax revenues increased from $2.2
billion in 1939 to $35.1 billion in 1945. This increase in federal tax revenue
from the income tax changed the balance in the relative size of the federal
government. Only during World War II did federal tax revenues begin to
exceed state and local tax revenues.
As discussed previously, national or central governments were, except
for periods of wartime, quite small throughout the Americas during the
nineteenth century. This was certainly true of the U.S. federal government,
whose peacetime activities were largely conﬁned to defense, foreign aﬀairs
and oversight of foreign trade, and general administration, with only ex-
tremely modest contributions going to infrastructure. State and local
government assumed nearly all of the responsibility for the provision
of schooling and publicly-provided transportation such as roads. Much of
this division of activities evolved naturally, as local governments took on
the tasks that communities wanted to get done and were willing to pay for.
State governments succeeded the provincial governments of colonial
times, and were keen to undertake programs that would stimulate eco-
nomic activity or otherwise improve welfare within their polities, whether
supporting transportation projects beyond the scope of towns, such as rail-
roads, or contributing supplemental funds to encourage the expansion of
public education. It might well be argued that the state and local govern-
ments were dominant in the provision of these sorts of public services, be-
cause these levels of government were more responsive to microlevel con-
cerns, or that the population was more willing to pay taxes for projects that
were clearly visible and likely to beneﬁt those bearing the cost. Part of the
relatively small size of the federal government during this era, however,
may have been attributable to constitutional restrictions imposed on the
federal government’s taxing authority. The framers severely limited the
power of the federal government to impose and collect direct taxes and
they required any duties, imposts, or excises to be uniform throughout the
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45. For more discussion of the history of the income tax, see Brownlee (1996) and Weisman
(2002).United States.46 Both measures were adopted to prevent regional interests
from using the federal government to shift a disproportionate tax burden
to other groups. While the constitutional limitation on direct taxes became
better known as a barrier to adopting a federal income tax,47the limitation
was primarily adopted by the founding fathers to prevent federal govern-
ment property taxes.48
As is evident from table 3.17, as the federal government has grown since
the 1940s, the relative shares of tax revenue for the federal, state, and local
governments have changed dramatically. Even though their tax revenues
increased from roughly 6.1 percent of GDP early in the twentieth century
to a post-WWII high of 9.7 percent of GDP in 1972, the relative size of lo-
cal governments plunged over the ﬁrst half of the century (from over 50 to
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46. Article 1, Section 8 provided Congress with the general authority to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, subject to the limitation that such taxes be uniform
throughout the United States. Article 1, Section 9 limited the ability of the federal government
to impose direct taxes by requiring “No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in
proportion to the census.” See generally, Brownlee (1996; 11–20).
47. In Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 US 429, aﬀ’d on rehearing 158 US 601
(1895), the Supreme Court held the income tax of the Wilson-Gorman Tariﬀunconstitutional
because it violated the prohibition on unapportioned direct taxes in Article 1, Section 9. The
Sixteenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, allowed Congress the power to impose income taxes
without apportionment among the States and without regard to any census or enumeration.
48. Representatives from slave states were concerned that a federal property tax would treat
slaves as property, farm states’ representatives were concerned that the tax might be based on
the size rather than the value of landholdings, and representatives of urban commercial areas
were concerned that the property tax would be based on assessed value. Brownlee (1996, 
14–15).
Table 3.17 Shares of tax revenue for the aggregate government sector in the United
States, 1902 through 2000 (%)
Federal tax revenues  State tax  Local tax  Social Security 
Year (excluding Social Security) revenues revenues revenues
1902 37.4 11.4 51.3
1912 29.2 13.3 57.6
1922 45.6 12.8 41.5
1932 22.7 23.7 53.6
1940 33.9 23.0 31.2 11.9
1950 63.4 14.3 14.4 7.9
1960 60.3 14.1 14.1 11.5
1970 52.5 17.2 14.0 16.3
1980 47.9 18.7 11.8 21.6
1990 41.8 19.8 13.3 25.1
2000 45.6 19.2 11.9 23.3
Sources:U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975); U.S. Census Bureau (1983, 1992, 2003); and C. Eu-
gene Steurle (2004, 260).below 15 percent), and has drifted down a bit more since (particularly as
constitutional and statutory limitations on the use of property taxes began
to bite).49
The composition of tax revenues for state and local governments in the
United States has changed as well. Although property taxes continue to be
the major source of tax revenues for local governments, state governments
rely far less on them than before. Some of the impetus for this latter shift
was the growing dissatisfaction with the property tax that began to surface
during the late nineteenth century.50 Spurred both by these concerns and
perhaps by the reintroduction of the federal income tax as well, most states
abolished general state-level property taxes during the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century and replaced them with state-level income taxes, excise
taxes (including levies on automobiles and gasoline to help pay for roads),
and sales taxes.51 Taxes on real property were left to local governments.
Property taxes contributed over half the revenues of state governments at
the beginning of the century, but by the 1940s they accounted for less than
6 percent. Today, property taxes account for 28.6 percent of total state and
local revenue, general sales taxes for 24.7 percent, selective sales taxes for
10.8 percent, individual income taxes for 24.3 percent, and corporate in-
come taxes account for 4.1 percent (other taxes account for 7.6 percent;
U.S. Bureau of the Census [2001]).
The regional variation noted in the relative size of local governments and
the use of tax instruments noted earlier for the nineteenth century per-
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49. See Steuerle (2004, 37), for changes in the size of local governments relative to the econ-
omy. A series of changes in state constitutions and statutes during the late 1970s and 1980s re-
stricted the use of property taxes. In 1978, California voters passed Proposition 13, which im-
posed a maximum property tax rate of 1 percent. As of 2002, forty-four states had some type
of restriction on the ability of local government to impose property taxes. These limitations
take diﬀerent forms: thirty-three states impose property tax rate limitations, twenty-seven
states impose limitations on property tax revenue limits, and six states impose limits on in-
creases in assessed property values (Brunori 2003, 61–62).
50. The property tax worked well (or was politically palatable) when the bulk of personal
wealth consisted of real property, there was conﬁdence in the ability of the electorate to mon-
itor the expenditures of local (or state) governments, and there was a sense that tax revenue
funded public goods and services that enhanced property values. As the variety of assets
available to individuals increased, however, criticisms that property taxes were both in-
equitable and ineﬃcient because either design or enforcement issues led to diﬀerent forms of
wealth being taxed at diﬀerent rates. State governments responded by nominally increasing
the legal scope of their property taxes to cover all types of property, such as cash, bonds,
stocks, and mortgages, but in reality the burden fell primarily on owners of real estate. Among
the prominent critics of the property tax were Richard T. Ely and Edwin R. Seligman. See Ely
(1888) and Seligman (1969 [1895]). Seligman contended that the property tax was defective in
ﬁve ways: (a) lack of uniformity or inequality in assessment; (b) lack of universality in its fail-
ure to eﬀectively tax personal property; (c) incentives to dishonesty in reporting and classify-
ing property; (d) potential for regressivity; and (e) potential for double taxation (see also
Seligman, 19–32). He suggested that in the early 1900s the property tax in New York fell 95
percent on real property and only 5 percent on personal property, despite the relative increase
in the proportion of wealth held in intangible personal property.
51. See the discussion in Einhorn (2006).sisted through the late twentieth century. Not only did the Midwest and the
Northeast continue to have relatively larger local governments, and rely
more on property taxes as a share of total state and local government rev-
enue than did the South and the West, but a marked association across
states between the extent of income inequality and the importance of prop-
erty taxes for ﬁnancing government goods and services was evident until
late in the twentieth century (for example, see ﬁgure 3.1 for the pattern in
1980).
In Canada, the government sector began to grow rapidly following in-
dependence in 1867. Not only did the British North America Act provide
for a centralized federal government with general taxing authority, but
provincial governments came under more pressure to raise revenues to
support the increasing demand for public services that accompanied the
population and economic booms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Tariﬀs and revenues obtained from public lands and resources
taxes were at ﬁrst the major sources of funds for the national and provin-
cial governments, but this began to change after Canada introduced its
ﬁrst federal income tax, in 1917, to fund the costs of Canada’s participa-
tion in World War I. Overall, the record of the evolution of tax institutions
in Canada over the twentieth century resembled that in the United States,
perhaps most notably in the prominence of the income tax (both to the fed-
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Fig. 3.1 Income inequality and the importance of property tax revenue: A plot of
the Gini coeﬃcients by the share of property taxes in total state and local govern-
ment revenue across all states, 1980
Source: For the state and local government revenue information, see U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus (1983, table 477, p. 284); and for the state-level Gini coeﬃcients for income inequality, see
table 702, p. 426.eral and provincial governments; Brownlee 1996). The Canadian pattern
was also much like that of the United States in the relative importance of
the local governments declining markedly over time (from nearly 40 per-
cent of the government sector as late as the 1920s to less than 10 percent
today) and the property tax remaining the dominant source of revenue for
local governments (with property tax receipts accounting for roughly 70
percent of revenue at 1950).52
3.4.2 Developments in Latin America
Latin American countries experienced major economic and political
changes over the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Of greatest sig-
niﬁcance was a sharp and broad (extending across much of Latin America)
acceleration in economic growth that began during the 1870s and 1880s,
spurred in large part from exogenous factors such as the expansion of in-
ternational trade around the world and higher prices for commodities in
which the region had a comparative advantage. Although this boom was
fueled by improvements in the technology and organization of interna-
tional transport and trade, as well as increases in demand for raw materi-
als and foodstuﬀs from rapidly-industrializing Europe, another major
stimulus to expanded production of tradable goods came from the real de-
preciation of the silver-backed currencies (common throughout Latin
America) that occurred during the late-nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, as the price of silver declined relative to gold. Where this latter de-
velopment occurred, the surge in commodity output extended beyond
agricultural produce (coﬀee, sugar, animal products, etc.) and natural re-
sources (such as oil, copper, and other minerals) to manufacturing pro-
duction (which helped to nurture the development of a powerful con-
stituency for higher tariﬀs) as well. Although there were interruptions in
the ascent of their economies, and the records and rates of progress varied
somewhat across countries, Latin America as a whole has grown at nearly
the same rate as the United States since 1870, after a period of relative stag-
nation for roughly the previous century.53
The initial phase of relatively sustained economic growth in Latin Amer-
ica was powered largely by the production of goods for foreign markets.
The growth in trade that this pursuit of international comparative advan-
tage led to increased revenues from tariﬀs (some of which had been raised
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52. Substantial variation exists among the provinces as to the percentage of total local gov-
ernment revenue from property and related taxes. In New Brunswick, Ontario, and Sas-
katchewan, property tax revenues are about half of total revenues while in Newfoundland
and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and the Northwest Territories property taxes are only
about 20 percent of total local government revenues. See Treﬀ and Perry (2004).
53. For an overview of industrial development in Latin America over the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, see Haber (2006). For general histories of economic, political, and
social changes in Latin America during the era, see Halperin Donghi (1993), Thorpe (1998),
and Bulmer-Thomas (2003).to protect local industry) and export taxes (or other means of procuring
revenues from the exploitation of natural resources) that supported an ex-
pansion of central governments.54 In the more progressive and prosperous
countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, this era of
trade-based growth yielded a sharp increase in national government sup-
port for public services such as schools (which local governments had con-
spicuously failed to do a good job at providing). In other generally less
democratic regimes such as Mexico and Peru, where military oﬃcers were
not infrequently prominent in political aﬀairs, the increases in revenue
were often diverted to enhancing domestic security or the armed forces.55
Central governments in Latin America did grow during the economic ex-
pansion of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but in gen-
eral—with exceptions, such as Argentina and Brazil—their sizes remained
quite modest by the standards of the United States or Canada (especially
considering the relatively large local and state/provincial governments in
those countries), as gauged relative to GDP, until the second half of the
twentieth century. Unlike the experience of their neighbors to the north, it
was not until the 1950s that most central governments in Latin America be-
gan to realize substantial growth relative to their respective economies (see
table 3.18). At ﬁrst, the additional tax revenues were obtained by the in-
troduction and raising of income taxes on individuals and corporations.
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54. For example, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela generally had
substantial nontax revenues to support government operations, mostly obtained from min-
ing, oil production, or (in the case of Panama), income from the Canal.
55. Such contrasts call attention to the slow pace of democratization in Latin America and
its implications for tax structures and government policies overall. As highlighted in table 3.1,
even the more progressive countries did not achieve rates of participation in elections com-
parable to those in the United States and Canada until the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury.
Table 3.18 National government tax revenue as a share of GDP (%)
Country 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Argentina 10 7 5 7 8 10 10 8 13 10 14
Bolivia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 10 5 14 18
Brazil 10 11 9 8 10 7 7 10 10 24 23
Chile n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9 11 17 16 32 21 24
Colombia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 7 8 10 12 13 14
Costa Rica n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10 12 14 18 23 21
Mexico 5 4 n.a. 6 7989 1 6 1 6 1 5
Peru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11 16 16 17 13 16
Uruguay n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 22 24 28
Venezuela n.a. n.a. 8 9 12 18 27 19 26 24 20
Sources:University of Oxford Latin American Centre (2006); United Nations Online Network in Public
Administration and Finance (UNPAN, 2006).
Note: n.a.   not available.The major increases in tax revenues that came during the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s, however, were generated largely by greater collections from turn-
over taxes and the value-added tax (VAT). In a few countries (most notably
Venezuela), expansions of the public sector were ﬁnanced by taxes on the
production of petroleum or other natural resources.56
Given the widespread recognition that the relative size of the govern-
ment sector typically increases with per capita income, it is perhaps not
surprising that tax burdens in Latin American countries were lower
throughout the twentieth century than in the United States and Canada.
What is more striking is that tax burdens are typically lighter in Latin
American countries than in other comparable developing countries.57 For
example, using estimates from the 1997 IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics, we can compare the aggregate tax burdens for Latin American coun-
tries to those of other economies with similar levels of per capita income.
Low-income developing countries (GDP per capita less than $1,000) are
reported as having a tax revenue/GDP ratio of 12.1 percent, medium-
income developing countries (GDP per capita between $1,000 and $5,000)
a ratio of 17.1 percent, and high-income developing countries (GDP per
capita greater than $5,000 and less than $20,000) a tax revenue/GDP ratio
of 25.6 percent.58With the exceptions of Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Panama
(which derives revenue from the Canal), the aggregate tax burdens in Latin
American countries are lower than the average for their respective income
classes of developing countries.
Looking at aggregate tax burdens tells only part of the story. In order to
better appreciate how the structure of taxes evolved in Latin America over
the twentieth century and the factors that contributed to those changes, it
is necessary to examine the relative use of diﬀerent tax instruments. What
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56. For example, in Venezuela during the late 1950s, taxes on petroleum accounted for two-
thirds of total tax revenue (see Sommerﬁeld 1966, 57).
57. Economic theory provides relatively little guidance as to optimal levels of taxation, but
at least until some level of taxation there is a positive correlation between per capita GDP and
tax levels (Burgess and Stern 1993). For the poorer developing countries, Burgess and Stern
ﬁnd a stronger correlation between increasing GDP and levels of taxation than in either richer
developing countries or in developed countries. They note that the richer developing coun-
tries often have substantial nontax revenue sources, either from revenue from state-owned re-
sources or from natural resources. For example, in Latin America, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador,
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela have substantial nontax revenues to support government
operations (see Inter-American Development Bank 1997, table C-10).
58. These statistics are roughly comparable to estimates available from other studies. For
example, Tanzi and Zee (2000) estimated that the tax-revenue-to-GDP ratio for all develop-
ing countries was 18.2 percent, and for OECD countries the ratio was 37.9 percent for the pe-
riod 1995–97 (see Tanzi and Zee 2000). Using a larger sample of countries, Fox and Gurley
(2005) found that low-income countries (per capita GDP of less than $1,000) raised tax rev-
enue amounting to 15.8 percent of GDP, medium-income countries (per capita GDP of be-
tween US $1,000–17,000) raised about 20.0 percent, and high-income countries (per capita
GDP greater than US $17,000) raised 27.2 percent. These estimates do not include social in-
surance payments.stands out from this record is that despite the substantial increase in the tax
revenues raised over the twentieth century, the pattern of Latin American
tax institutions generally avoiding taxes that are commonly understood as
progressive has persisted. As we have discussed previously, during the ﬁrst
decades of the twentieth century, Latin American countries continued to
rely heavily on customs revenue, with tariﬀs set both to raise central gov-
ernment revenue as well as to protect inﬂuential economic interests (in-
cluding local industry and workers generally) from foreign competition.59
In 1930, for example, taxes on international trade (primarily tariﬀs but
some taxes on exports) accounted for: 44 percent of central government
revenue in Brazil; 48 percent in Argentina; 54 percent in Chile; 55 percent
in Colombia; 41 percent in Mexico; and 51 percent in Venezuela. The im-
portance of these taxes on international trade decreased dramatically over
the second half of the century, however, and nowhere today do they ac-
count for more than 15 percent. For a short interval, during the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, income taxes (which fell much more heavily on corpora-
tions than on individuals) replaced tariﬀs as the major source of revenue,
but in recent decades there has been a return to the longstanding practice
of relying on commodity taxes. Perhaps encouraged by international
movements toward greater openness, taxes on domestic goods and ser-
vices (particularly the VAT) have assumed the dominant role in raising
revenue.60
Table 3.19 provides a representative snapshot of the current sources of
tax revenue to the central governments in Latin America and in the United
States and Canada. Most salient is the much greater importance of indirect
taxation in Latin America (and the corresponding much greater impor-
tance of income taxation in the two northern countries). Even aside from
the obvious centrality of the VAT,61 it is striking that nearly everywhere in
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59. Haber (2006) and Bulmer-Thomas (2003).
60. Our characterizations of the change over time in the relative use of tax instruments are
based on the data and estimates presented in Bulmer-Thomas (2003, table 6.6); International
Monetary Fund (various years); Richard Musgrave and Malcolm Gillis (1971, 271–73, tables
3–5), Sommerﬁeld (1966, 56, table 5); Thirsk (1997, 289, table 7.1), and Thorp (1998, 346,
tables VII.1–2).
61. As is well known, the introduction and diﬀusion of the VAT over the second half of the
twentieth century changed the tax landscape throughout the world (with the notable excep-
tion of the United States). See Liam P. Ebrill et al. (2001) for a review of this development.
Latin American countries were among the leaders in replacing an ineﬃcient collection of
turnover taxes with VATs. From a political economy perspective the relative success of the
VATs came along at a very good time. It allowed many Latin American countries to increase
tax revenues (and reduce tariﬀs) without substantial reliance on income taxes. See Keen and
Ligthart (1999). Brazil was the ﬁrst Latin American country to adopt the VAT (1967), fol-
lowed by Ecuador (1970), Uruguay (1970), Bolivia (1973), Argentina (1975), Colombia
(1975), Honduras (1976), Peru (1976), Panama (1977), Guatemala (1983), Mexico (1980),

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Latin America more revenue (and often far more) is raised from both trade
taxes as well as excise taxes than from individual income taxes.62
It is to be expected that low-income countries employ diﬀerent types of
taxes than do high-income countries, but Latin American societies stand
out relative to other economies at similar levels of development. Table 3.20
presents a summary of the relative use of diﬀerent tax instruments by coun-
tries at diﬀerent per capita income levels. First, consider general taxes on
domestic goods and services as well as excise taxes. As discussed previ-
ously, Latin American countries rely on these taxes for about 57 percent of
their total tax revenue.63 Moreover, they generally rely more on these rev-
enue sources than do their counterparts in the respective ranges of per
capita income. For example, while most Latin American countries would
be considered richer developing countries (per capita income of between
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62. Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2002, table 7). Today, revenues from excise taxes account
for over 20 percent of total tax revenues in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua,
but less than 5 percent in Colombia and Mexico. For most other countries in Latin America,
revenues from excise taxes account for about ten to ﬁfteen percent of total tax revenues. In
contrast, revenues from excise taxes represent only three to four percent of the total tax rev-
enues in the United States and Canada. In the early 1980s, only in Chile, Colombia, and Mex-
ico did individual income tax revenues exceed excise tax revenues.
63. The statistics in table 3.19 are in line with the estimates of Tanzi and Zee (2000). They
conﬁrm that most countries rely on general consumption taxes, such as the VAT, excise taxes,
and trade taxes to fund a substantial portion of government operations. In OECD countries,
general consumption tax revenues for 1995–97 account for 11.4 percent of GDP. By compar-
ison, in developing countries, general consumption tax revenues for the same time period ac-
count for 10.5 percent of GDP.
Table 3.20 Relative use of diﬀerent tax instruments by national governments, by per
capita income level: World averages (1990–1995 GDP estimates; %)
150–500 500–5,000 5,000–20,000  20,000 All
Tax revenue as percent of total 
government revenue 84 87 87 87 87
Total tax revenue
Individual and corporate tax 23 21 35 33 26
Corporate tax 11 11 13 8 10
Individual income tax 12 10 22 25 16
Taxes on property 3 1 2 3 2
Domestic taxes on goods and 
services 43 45 34 32 39
Excises 17 13 12 9 12
Taxes on international trade 
and transportation 21 10 9 1 9
Import duties 20 9 9 1 9
Social security 11 23 20 30 24
Source: International Monetary Fund (2004), for years 1998–2002.$5,000–20,000), the average for that class is 46 percent.64 Perhaps the most
distinguishing feature of this perspective on Latin American tax systems,
however, is again in their neglect of income taxes, especially individual in-
come taxes. On average, Latin American countries raise about 25 percent
of total tax revenues from income taxes, with about 19 percent from cor-
porate tax revenues and about 6 percent from individual income tax rev-
enues. In contrast, the richer developing countries on average raise about
36 percent of tax revenues from income taxes (13 percent from corporate
and 22 percent from individual income tax revenues).65 Given that the in-
dividual income tax is often viewed today as the most progressive major tax
instrument, its minor role in Latin America might seem a continuation of
a long tradition of gentle treatment of the elite by the tax institutions of
that region.
As we emphasized earlier, perhaps the most distinctive and fundamen-
tally important feature of Latin American governmental and tax struc-
tures during the nineteenth century was the high degree of centralization.
Local governments in Latin America were quite small by the standards of
North American countries. In recent decades there has been an increased
awareness in Latin America of the possible implications of stunted local
governments, especially for the provision of public services. This has led to
a wave of policies across the region that are aimed at transferring more re-
sources from the central government to local (if not provincial as well) gov-
ernments. Table 3.21 presents estimates for ﬁve Latin American countries
of the distribution of tax revenues and expenditures across levels of gov-
ernment, before and after the ﬁrst generation of decentralization that be-
gan in the early 1980s.66 Substantial variation in the size of local and
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64. A few Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay, belong in the middle-
income group (with per capita income between $500 and $5000), but their reliance on do-
mestic taxes on goods and services as well as excises (58 and 59 percent, respectively), is
roughly equal to the average for this category (58 percent).
65. It may also be useful to compare the relative use of tax instruments by Latin American
countries to choices made by governments in developing countries in other parts of the world.
Perhaps the most interesting comparisons are between developing countries in Africa and in
Latin America. As compared to Latin America, African countries rely more on income taxes
(28–14 percent from corporate and 14 percent from individual income tax revenues) and taxes
on international tax (31 percent), and less on domestic taxes on goods and services (22 per-
cent), excise taxes (11 percent), and social security taxes (5 percent). Again, what is striking
is the relative use of individual income taxes. Whereas African countries raise 14 percent of
total tax revenues from individual income taxes, Latin American countries raise only about 6
percent. For the period between 1996 and 2002, developing countries in Asia raised, on aver-
age, about 37 percent of total tax revenue from income taxes (16 percent from individual in-
come taxes and 21 percent from corporate income taxes), 45 percent from general consump-
tion and excise taxes, and 14 percent from trade taxes (IMF 2004, online version).
66. See Wiesner (2003, 10), describing the ﬁrst generation of decentralization as character-
ized by: (a) implementation of constitutional reforms that provided for automatic and largely
unconditional transfers from central government to subnational governments; (b) introduc-
tion of targeted ﬁscal transfers through formulas to speciﬁc sectors and to low-income
groups; (c) an alleged process of devolving resources together with devolving responsibilities;
(d) delegation of some limited taxing and spending authority; and (e) a general lack of any in-provincial governments is evident, with Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia
having the largest subnational governments (especially Brazil, which has
relatively large provincial governments), Venezuela, Mexico, and Bolivia
somewhere in the middle, and all other countries having even smaller sub-
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Table 3.21 Shares of total government tax revenues and of expenditures by level of government
in selected Latin American countries: Before and after programs to decentralize (%)
Share of total government tax revenue  Share of total government expenditure 
collected by level of government by level of government
Before With Before With 
decentralization decentralization decentralization decentralization
Argentina a
Central 79.3 80.0 63.5 51.9
Provincial 13.7 15.4 31.0 39.5
Local 7.0 4.6 5.4 8.6
Brazil b
Central 59.8 47.1 50.2 36.5
State 36.9 49.4 36.2 40.7
Local 3.8 3.6 13.6 22.8
Colombia c
Central 82.2 81.6 72.8 67.0
Departmental 12.2 11.1 16.7 15.7
Local 5.6 7.3 10.5 17.3
Mexicod
Central 90.7 82.7 90.2 87.8
State 8.3 13.4 8.8 9.5
Local 1.0 3.9 1.0 2.8
Venezuelae
Central 95.8 96.9 76.0 77.7
State 0.1 0.1 14.9 15.7
Local 4.0 3.1 9.1 6.5
Sources:For Argentina and Colombia, López Murphy (1995, 22, 25, 33). For Brazil, Anwar Shah (1990,
15). For Venezuela, World Bank (1992, 5). For Mexico, Victoria E. Rodríguez (1987, 271); and INEGI
(1994).
aFigures before decentralization as of 1983, under decentralization as of 1992.
bFigures before decentralization as of 1974, under decentralization as of 1988.
cFigures before decentralization as of 1980, under decentralization as of 1991.
dFigures before decentralization as of 1982, under decentralization as of 1992.
eFigures before decentralization as of 1980, under decentralization as of 1989.
dependent evaluation of results. The second generation of decentralization policies began in
the late 1990s and provided for tighter macroeconomic budget constraints, stronger inter-
governmental regulatory frameworks, and more intensive use of incentives at the sectoral
level (Wiesner 2003, 12).national governments.67 Largely because of the enormous increase in the
size of the federal governments in the United States and Canada, as well as
the large transfers from the central to the provincial governments in Brazil
and Argentina, the contrast between the rich countries in the North and
their neighbors in Latin America is not nearly so stark in this dimension as
it was in the past. Nevertheless, subnational governments remain quite
modest throughout Latin America, and the nineteenth century pattern en-
dures, especially when gauged by tax revenues.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have begun to explore how the extreme inequality that
came to characterize nearly all Latin American countries during their
colonial periods may have inﬂuenced how their tax institutions evolved.
We seek to understand why the tax structures of Latin American countries
are so distinctive today, even relative to other developing countries with
roughly similar per capita incomes, and why their national governments
have historically been so dominant and their local governments stunted.
One traditional explanation for the types of tax regimes adopted by Latin
American countries highlights technical or resource constraints. Develop-
ing countries have a much more limited administrative capacity to collect
income and other complex taxes involving the monitoring of individuals
than developed countries. The existence of large informal service and agri-
cultural sectors further complicates the task of tax design and enforce-
ment. Thus, it is not surprising that Latin American and other developing
countries focus more on revenue sources such as taxes on trade, taxes im-
posed on foreign corporations, and general consumption and excise taxes.
That being said, our examination suggests that the government and tax
structures of the Latin American societies had already diverged from those
in the United States and Canada by, if not before, the middle of the nine-
teenth century—not long after attaining independence and before there
were substantial diﬀerences in per capita income. Although the causal
mechanisms remain to be explored, we emphasize the striking parallels be-
tween how the institutions of taxation evolved across the hemisphere and
how other fundamental social and economic institutions evolved (such
as those involving suﬀrage, education, and ownership of land). In Latin
America, where a substantial gap existed and persisted in the economic cir-
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67. Wills, Garman, and Haggard (1995) review the movements toward decentralization in
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, examining the inﬂuence that central
government has over local ﬁnances. They examine the relative discretion the federal govern-
ment has in determining the amount of transferred funds, the ability of central governments
to impose conditions on the use of funds, and the ability of local governments to borrow
funds. They ﬁnd that the degree of decentralization reﬂects the relative political power of
presidents, legislators, and subnational governments, and that the structure of political par-
ties in the respective countries inﬂuences the level of autonomy of lower levels of government.cumstances and political inﬂuence between elites and the bulk of the pop-
ulation, these institutions tended to develop along paths that greatly ad-
vantaged those elites. Control over voting rules assured elites of greatly
disproportionate political representation. Very modest commitments to
public investments, such as schooling, kept taxes low and competition in
the labor markets for individuals from good backgrounds limited. Land
policies kept land ownership in the hands of a relative few. Where govern-
ment services were provided, funds were raised primarily through means
other than direct taxation of income, wealth, or property.
This path of institutional development was radically diﬀerent from
those followed by the relatively homogenous Canada and the United
States. Although there may be other explanations for these patterns, the ev-
idence seems consistent with our hypothesis that diﬀerences in the extent
of inequality across these societies contributed to the diﬀerent political de-
cisions they made regarding the nature and size of diﬀerent levels of gov-
ernment and the relative use of diﬀerent tax instruments (if not the types
and scale of government expenditure programs as well). As we have shown,
there were no major diﬀerences during the nineteenth century in how
national governments chose to raise their revenue. The United States,
Canada, and Latin American countries all relied overwhelmingly on cus-
toms duties, other levies on foreign trade, and excise taxes. However, the
United States and Canada were quite unlike their Latin American coun-
terparts in ﬁnancing local governments whose programs (generally public
schools, roads, water and sanitation projects, other public health measures,
etc.) were so extensive that they rivaled or exceeded their respective central
government in resources consumed and services rendered. The funding for
these substantial local governments came overwhelmingly from taxes on
property, wealth, and income. State and local governments were successful
in raising revenue through such instruments primarily because the large
share of nineteenth century wealth was held in land, but it is telling that
Latin American societies did not experience the same growth of local gov-
ernments. Given that the record in Canada and the United States, where
local governments funded primarily by property taxes trace back to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it appears very diﬃcult to argue that
the Latin American policies were dictated by technical or resource con-
straints on their ability to administer such taxes.
Latin American countries continue to have the highest rates of income
inequality in the world. They still have relatively low aggregate tax burdens
and generally rely on taxes on consumption, rather than on taxes on indi-
vidual income, wealth, or property. Likewise, the central governments are
still more dominant, relative to state and local authorities, than they are in
the United States, Canada, and other regions of the world. It is not clear
whether the persistence in the character of tax institutions and government
structures can be attributed to the same factors and processes that oper-
Inequality and the Evolution of Institutions of Taxation 131ated during the nineteenth century. Much has changed in Latin America
over the twentieth century. The progress in broadening the distribution of
political inﬂuence (democratization), for example, would lead one to ex-
pect that the relative inﬂuence of elites on the design of institutions should
be diminished and the demand for certain types of government programs
should be increased. Even with political changes, however, it is diﬃcult to
design progressive tax structures in societies marked by great inequality.
In addition, in recent years, the range of options available to government
tax authorities has narrowed as economies have become more open and
capital more mobile. While changes in Latin America over the last 10 to
15 years have increased expenditures on social programs and, often, in-
creased the resources available to local governments to fund those pro-
grams, the changes on the tax side have been less dramatic. Perhaps future
political and economic developments will change the patterns of taxation
in Latin America. In looking at the current structures, however, the evi-
dence suggests that the long history of extreme inequality in Latin Amer-
ica is central to understanding the distinctive set of tax institutions that
have evolved in Latin America.
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